# Robinson Protective Alarm Co. v. Bolger & Picker

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · October 3, 1986 · 512 Pa. 116

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9544321

## Case

- **Full name:** ROBINSON PROTECTIVE ALARM COMPANY v. BOLGER & PICKER, Appellee, Richard ROBINSON and Continental Bank, Appellants. Appeal of CONTINENTAL BANK
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 3, 1986
- **Citations:** 512 Pa. 116; 516 A.2d 299; 1986 Pa. LEXIS 877
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Hutchinson
- **Judges:** Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos
- **Cited by:** 33 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9544321

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding no provision of the UFA restricts the immunity from liability to suits based on negligence or precludes its applicability to suits based on a contract theory

## Opinion text

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. They correctly state that recovery on a breach of contract theory requires a causal relationship between the breach and the loss and none is shown here. (Majority opinion at 303, n. 9).
The failure of the appellant-depository to secure the signature of the party expressly empowered to redeem the certificates of deposit did not contribute in any way to the loss suffered by the appellee. Thus, I am troubled by the eagerness of the majority to assume the requisite causal link in order to reach the question of whether the Uniform Fiduciary Act wholly insulates the depository from contractual liability unless it acts in bad faith. The majority’s discussion regarding the Uniform Fiduciary Act is unnecessary and possibly mischievous dictum.
I do not believe the Uniform Fiduciary Act was intended to abrogate express contractual obligations by which a *128 depository expressly imposed upon itself a standard of care higher than good faith. Although I find no evidence on this record of the kind of express bargain necessary to overrule the good faith standard the Act normally implies into such contracts, in my view, if a depositor-fiduciary bargains for a higher standard of care and the depository expressly agrees to be governed by that higher standard, that agreement should be enforced. Such an agreement should not be easily implied and the Act’s standard of good faith should be the standard used in any doubtful case. Any implication of such an agreement, in the absence of an expressly undertaken obligation, would defeat the Act’s general purpose of facilitating commercial transactions involving assets held by a fiduciary.
The Uniform Fiduciary Act wisely relieves depositories of the obligation to ascertain the legitimacy of a fiduciary’s transaction so long as the depository acts in “good faith.” This insures the expeditious flow of commercial transactions.
Nevertheless, a depository should not be allowed to utilize the Uniform Fiduciary Act as an impenetrable shield against liability to which it has expressly agreed in assuming a contractual duty to scrutinize payments or deliveries to a depository-fiduciary. In short, the Act’s protections against liability should not be extended to undermine contractual liabilities which are bargained for and expressly assumed.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9544321. Public record. Not legal advice.