# Tatrai v. Presbyterian University Hospital

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · January 29, 1982 · 497 Pa. 247

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9543778

## Case

- **Full name:** Mary B. TATRAI, Formerly Mary B. Fleming, Appellant, v. PRESBYTERIAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 29, 1982
- **Citations:** 497 Pa. 247; 439 A.2d 1162; 1982 Pa. LEXIS 370
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Roberts
- **Judges:** O'Brien, Roberts, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Kauffman, Wilkinson
- **Cited by:** 52 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9543778

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that an employee who alleged negligence against her hospital .employer for emergency room treatment was not precluded by the workers’ compensation statute because she was treated as a paying member of the public and her presence in the emergency room was not in the fur…
- holding that an employee who alleged negligence against her hospital employer for emergency room treatment was not precluded by the workers’ compensation statute because she was treated as a paying member of the public and her presence in the emergency room was not in the furt…

## Opinion text

ROBERTS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the order of the Superior Court must be reversed, but on a ground other than that set forth by the opinion of Mr. Justice Nix. Contrary to the view of the opinion of Mr. Justice Nix, whether appellant’s injury arose in the course of employment is irrelevant to appellant’s right to proceed in trespass and assumpsit. All that is relevant is that appellant was injured in the course of receiving treatment in appellee’s emergency room, a facility serving the general public. In holding itself out to the public as a provider of medical services, appellee hospital owed a duty to all its patients. There is no basis for distinguishing *256 appellant, a paying customer, from any other member of the public injured during the course of treatment. “ ‘All were subjected to the same danger. All were entitled to like treatment under law.’ ” Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415 , 83 S.Ct. 1349, 1353 , 10 L.Ed.2d 448 (1963), quoting Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 413 , 74 S.Ct. 202, 207 , 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953).
In an analogous setting, the Supreme Court of California recently observed:
“[I]f any injury arises from a relationship which is distinct from that of employer and employee and invokes a different set of obligations than the employer’s duties to its employee, there is no justification for shielding the employer from liability at common law.”
D’Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.3d 661, 666 , 166 Cal.Rptr. 177, 181 , 613 P.2d 238, 242 (1980). The Supreme Court of Ohio has reached a similar conclusion:
“Appellee’s argument is that Ohio’s workers’ compensation requires us to ignore the fact that appellee hospital was not only the employer of appellant, but also the treating hospital and, as such, charged with the obligations that arise in a hospital-patient relationship.... Appellant’s need for protection from malpractice was neither more nor less than that of another’s employee. . . . The appellee hospital, with respect to its treatment of the appellant, did so as a hospital, not as an employer, ¿nd its relationship with the appellant was that of a hospital-patient with all the concomitant traditional obligations. Furthermore, it is not denied that, if appellant’s compensable injury had been aggravated by any other hospital, appellant would have had a cause of action for malpractice. We find no compelling reason why an action should be less viable merely because the traditional obligations and duties of the tortfeasor spring from the extra-relational capacity of the employer, rather than a third party.”
Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St.2d 183, 189 , 378 N.E.2d 488, 492 (1978). See generally 2A Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 72.80 (1976).
*257 In a case involving the Longshoremen’s Compensation Act, the Supreme Court of the United States similarly recognized the independent force of a duty owed to the general public:
“[OJnly blind adherence to the superficial meaning of a statute could prompt us to ignore the fact that Pan-Atlantic was not only an employer of longshoremen but was also a bareboat charterer and operator of a ship and, as such, was charged with the traditional, absolute, and nondelegable obligation of seaworthiness which it could not be permitted to avoid.”
Reed v. The Yaka, supra, 373 U.S. at 415 , 83 S.Ct. at 1353 (1963). Here, too, only “blind adherence” to the language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act — an act designed to help, not hinder, employees in their pursuit of benefits — could deprive appellant of the opportunity to proceed on her causes of action.
Accordingly, without regard to issues relating to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, appellant must be permitted to proceed directly to trial.
O’BRIEN, C. J., and LARSEN and FLAHERTY, JJ, join in this concurring opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9543778. Public record. Not legal advice.