# King v. Globe Newspaper Co. > Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · August 17, 1987 · 400 Mass. 705 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9543153 ## Case - **Full name:** Edward J. King vs. the Globe Newspaper Company & Others - **Court:** Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court - **Decided:** August 17, 1987 - **Citations:** 400 Mass. 705; 512 N.E.2d 241; 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1811; 1987 Mass. LEXIS 1441 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Nolan - **Judges:** Wilkins, Liacos, Abrams, Nolan, O'Connor - **Cited by:** 151 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9543153 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - reversing determination that article not susceptible to defamatory meaning based on views of “average reader” where reasonable that “considerable and respectable segment of the community” would nevertheless read article as discrediting plaintiff - finding that statements of opinion cannot serve as a basis for defamation liability ## Opinion text *735 Nolan, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the court’s determination that the case should be remanded to the Superior Court for trial on counts 1 and 2, the counts in which the plaintiff alleges that he was libeled by the Farrell column of November 8, 1981. I also agree with the court’s determination that the Superior Court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to counts 3 through 6 and counts 9 through 12.1 disagree, however, with the court’s disposition regarding the Ackerley billboard cartoon (Appendix C) which is the subject of counts 7 and 8. Because I think that there is a material issue of fact to be resolved, I dissent from that portion of the court’s opinion which affirms the granting of summary judgment on those counts. A jury question exists in a defamation action if the challenged statement is susceptible of being read by an average reader as either a factual statement or an opinion. Aldoupolis v. Globe Newspaper Co., 398 Mass. 731, 733-734 (1986). Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 339-340 (1980). A cartoon is subject to the law of libel and, like any other form of depiction, “it may be found libelous if it maliciously presents as fact defamatory material which is false.” Yorty v. Chandler, 13 Cal. App. 3d 467, 472 (1970). See Russell v. McMillen, 685 P.2d 255, 259 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 comment d (1977). In Yorty , the court suggested that “apolitical cartoon which falsely depicts a public official selling franchises for personal gain, or a judge taking a bribe, or an attorney altering a public record, or a police officer shooting a defenseless prisoner, will not be exempt from redress under the laws of libel merely because the charge is depicted graphically in linear form rather than verbally in written statement.” Yorty, supra at 472 . Such is the nature of the cartoon here. Notwithstanding the facts disclosed in the accompanying editorial, the average reader could have interpreted that cartoon as stating that the Governor and the Secretary of Transportation accepted cash bribes in exchange for taking actions favorable to Ackerley Communications and to the billboard industry. Contrary to the defendants’ assertions, nothing in the cartoon suggests that persons associated with *736 Ackerley Communications merely contributed toward the Gov-emor’s campaign. The use of the word “pockets,” along with the depiction of bags of cash in the hands of the Governor and the Secretary (who had no campaign fund to accept contributions), could lead the average reader to conclude that Ackerley Communications bribed the Governor and his cabinet secretary. “[Wjhen an ‘opinion’ is something more than a generally derogatory remark [and] is laden with factual content, such as charging the commission of serious crimes, the First Amendment confers no absolute immunity.” Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 63 (2d Cir. 1980). Since the average reader could have interpreted the cartoon as charging a serious crime, it is for the jury to determine whether the cartoon was in fact defamatory. I also think there is an issue of fact for the jury on whether the defendants acted with actual malice in publishing the Ack-erley cartoon. Actual malice is proved “by a showing that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false.” Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 867 (1975). In this case both the cartoonist and the editor of the editorial page were aware that Ackerley had not actually put money in the pockets of the Governor or the Secretary of Transportation, yet neither the cartoonist nor the editor took any steps to disclose this fact in the cartoon. In addition, both the cartoonist and the editor could not remember whether they read the entire news story on which the cartoon was based. If the jury were to conclude that the cartoon made false and defamatory statements of fact, the jury would also be warranted in drawing inferences from these omissions in finding malice. Thus, I would remand the case for trial on the Ackerley cartoon as well as on the Farrell column. “The protection of the freedom of a responsible press does not require that we insulate from liability for libel the artists whose pens drip venom and whose skill in drawing and cartooning far exceeds their sense of responsibility, respect for the truth and the depth of their understanding of public issues.” Yorty, supra at 479 (Compton, J., concurring in the result). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9543153. Public record. Not legal advice.