# Ryan v. Workman's Compensation Appeal Board

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · February 26, 1998 · 550 Pa. 550

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9542293

## Case

- **Full name:** Mary RYAN, Appellee, v. WORKMAN’S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES). Appeal of COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 26, 1998
- **Citations:** 550 Pa. 550; 707 A.2d 1130
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Nigro
- **Judges:** Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman
- **Cited by:** 44 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9542293

## Opinion text

NIGRO, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s holding that the Claimant’s injury should have been classified as a mental/mental injury and that she has not met her burden of showing, sufficient for recovery, that those injuries result from abnormal working conditions.
Claimant did not report any psychological problems until almost two years following the automobile accident, and then not until she learned that she was being sued by the other driver. Thus, her condition is properly characterized as a mental disability resulting from a mental stimulus (“mental/ mental”). Claimant’s mental/mental injury is not compensable since she failed to prove the psychological stimulus occurred *564 as a result of abnormal working conditions in the course of her employment.
However, in determining compensability, I believe we must be vigilant in distinguishing those cases which may seem to be mental injuries brought on by mental stimuli (mental/mental) but are actually mental injuries caused by physical trauma. For example, I would categorize as physical/mental a latent psychological disorder, not immediately apparent, which is ultimately triggered by a mental stimulus, but nonetheless has its genesis in an original physical trauma. This mental disability may not surface until some time has passed and claimant inadvertently “revisits” the original physical trauma in her mind. Similarly, I would analyze as physical/mental a physical trauma simultaneously accompanied by psychological injury, which psychological injury may seem to heal but may actually recur when triggered by a mental stimulus associated with the original physical harm.
These delayed emotional reactions should not be mistaken as being unrelated to the physical harm when, in reality, the two are conjoined. Simply because the mental problem is “triggered” by a mental stimulus does not mean that it is not in fact caused by the physical injury. These examples represent classic patterns of emotional harm brought about by physical trauma (“physical/mental”) and reflect the mind’s ability not only to attempt to block a person’s more horrible experiences, but to then flood with vivid memory on the slightest provocation. Both paradigms can produce debilitating psychological harm and are properly characterized as physical/mental injuries.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9542293. Public record. Not legal advice.
