# Evans v. Brown

> Appellate Court of Illinois · March 23, 2010 · 399 Ill. App. 3d 238

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9541893

## Case

- **Full name:** SHAVONNE L. EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRAD BROWN, Special Adm’r for the Estate of Lynn R. Romann, Deceased, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** March 23, 2010
- **Citations:** 399 Ill. App. 3d 238; 925 N.E.2d 1265
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Pope
- **Judges:** Steigmann, Pope
- **Cited by:** 43 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9541893

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding “[a] sudden illness or death that renders a driver incapable of controlling his car, provided that the event is unforeseeable and beyond the power of human intervention to prevent, is an act of God”
- stating that if the defendant establishes facts with supporting documents entitling judgment on an affirmative defense, the plaintiff must then present a factual basis arguably entitling him to a judgment

## Opinion text

JUSTICE POPE, specially concurring:
I agree with the majority that summary judgment was precluded in this case because a question of fact existed about the cause of the accident. I write separately to clarify a few matters. First, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the trial court’s handling of the matter as “inappropriate.” 399 Ill. App. 3d at 251. As the majority points out, the lawyers did not frame the issue concerning the Act in a way that invited the court to rule on the matter. Second, the majority finds evidence of Romann’s statements to Eldridge about falling asleep were “potentially” dispositive. 399 Ill. App. 3d at 251. Apparently, such evidence was “actually” dispositive as to the motion for summary judgment, because we have ruled this evidence created a question of fact which precluded a grant of summary judgment. Third, while defendants seemed quite confident in the trial court the Act would bar admission of Romann’s statement to Eldridge, I would note the Act is a bar to testimony of an adverse party or person directly interested in the action. 735 ILCS 5/8 — 201 (West 2008). Since Eldridge is not an adverse party, nor does he appear to have an interest in the case, his testimony, in my opinion, would not come within the purview of the Act. Since it does not come within the purview of the Act, it appears to be admissible and thus available to create the question of fact we have relied on in reversing the grant of summary judgment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9541893. Public record. Not legal advice.