# Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · December 17, 1981 · 496 Pa. 590

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9541444

## Case

- **Full name:** Howard Lewis RUTTER, a Minor, by His Parents and Natural Guardians, Billy Dean Rutter and Lucy Rutter and Billy Dean Rutter and Lucy Rutter, in Their Own Right, Appellants, v. the NORTHEASTERN BEAVER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Gregg Zimmerman and John North, and Thomas W. George, Jr., Appellees
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 17, 1981
- **Citations:** 496 Pa. 590; 437 A.2d 1198; 1981 Pa. LEXIS 1135
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Roberts
- **Judges:** O'Brien, Roberts, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Kauffman, Wilkinson
- **Cited by:** 111 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9541444

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- emphasizing that when evaluating assumption of the risk courts should be "concerned with what appellant actually knew, and not what the reasonable man should have known"
- clarifying assumption of risk doctrine available in products liability cases

## Opinion text

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
A review of the record demonstrates that appellant has failed to sustain his burden on the issue of proximate cause. Even assuming that appellees breached some duty, appellant has presented no evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that any alleged breach of duty by appellee was responsible for appellant’s injury. As this Court has stated,
“[I]t remains a principle so fundamental as to require no authority that the mere existence of negligence and the occurrence of injury are insufficient to impose liability upon anyone. There remains to be proved the vitally important link of causation. And plaintiff has the burden of proving this link, that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of her injury; or of proving evidence from which a reasonable inference arises that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.”
*617 Cuthbert v. Philadelphia, 417 Pa. 610, 614 , 209 A.2d 261, 263 (1965) (citations omitted). 1
It is equally well settled that “where the evidence in a case affords no greater basis for a jury’s verdict than a guess or conjecture, the evidence is legally insufficient to support a verdict, and the case must be withdrawn.” 6 Std. Pa. Practice Ch. 25 § 21, p. 272. Here, on the evidence presented, the jury could do no more than guess at whether protective equipment, increased supervision, or improved lighting would have prevented the particular injury received by appellant.
Because appellant has not carried his burden of proof on the issue of proximate cause, it is unnecessary to address the applicability of the affirmative defense of assumption of risk to this case, let alone attempt to decide the continuing viability of a doctrine which has not previously been questioned by this Court. See, e. g., Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., 483 Pa. 75 , 394 A.2d 546 (1978). 2
The trial court’s granting of a compulsory nonsuit was correct and, thus, the order of the Superior Court upholding the nonsuit should be affirmed.
WILKINSON, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
. While the testimony of appellant’s expert witness might have been relevant to the issue of appellees’ duty, his testimony would not have shed any light on the issue of proximate cause.
. Because only three of the seven members of this Court participating in this decision would abrogate assumption of risk, assumption of risk remains the law of this Commonwealth, see Mt. Lebanon v. County Board of Elections, 470 Pa. 317, 322-323 , 368 A.2d 648, 650-651 (1977), and thus is available to the defendants on remand.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9541444. Public record. Not legal advice.
