# Gazette, Inc. v. Harris > Supreme Court of Virginia · February 1, 1985 · 229 Va. 1 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9539501 ## Case - **Full name:** The Gazette, Inc. v. James William Harris, Et Al.; Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc. v. Debra C. Matthews; Port Packet Corporation v. E. Grey Lewis, Et Al.; James N. Fleming v. W. Bedford Moore, III - **Court:** Supreme Court of Virginia - **Decided:** February 1, 1985 - **Citations:** 229 Va. 1; 325 S.E.2d 713; 54 A.L.R. 4th 685; 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1609; 1985 Va. LEXIS 171 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Harrison - **Judges:** Carrico, Cochran, Poff, Compton, Stephenson, Harrison, Gordon, Harman - **Cited by:** 220 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9539501 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that Article I, Section 12 of the Virginia Constitution[31] "recognizes the balance to be struck between the right of free expression enjoyed by the individual and the press on the one hand and the right of defamed individuals to hold the speakers `responsible' for dam… - holding that Article I, Section 12 of the Virginia Constitution31 “recognizes the balance to be struck between the right of free expression enjoyed by the individual and the press on the one hand and the right of defamed individuals to ' hold the speakers ‘responsible’ for dam… - holding $100,000 compensatory damage award excessive as a matter of law where libel plaintiff “experienced no physical manifestation of any emotional distress[,] ... sought no medical attention for any condition resulting from the publication, [and there was] no evidence that … - explaining that private figure plaintiffs must establish by a “preponderance of the evidence that the publication was false, and that the defendant either knew it to be false, or believing it to be true, lacked reasonable grounds for such belief, or acted negligently in failin… - stating that a plaintiff alleging defamation "need not show that he was mentioned by name in the publication" and that it is sufficient to show that "the publication was in its description or identi- fication such as to lead those who knew or knew of the plaintiff to believe t… ## Opinion text HARRISON, Retired Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The opinion of the majority finds precedential support in cases decided by this and several other state courts. I agree that in each of the cases under review the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care and therefore acted negligently. This dissent stems from my disagreement with the Court’s refusal to adopt in defamation cases as a matter of state law a stricter standard than that of ordinary negligence. Ordinary care is that care which is commensurate with the occasion. It is not absolute or intrinsic. It is always relative to some circumstances of time, place, manner, or person and becomes a question of fact to be decided by a jury. Juries are randomly selected, and the principal criteria for service thereon is not to be a felon, not under age eighteen, and not unable to communicate in the English language. Present-day ju *54 ries often return verdicts that are completely out of proportion to the harm done. The verdicts under review are no exception. Trial judges are reluctant to disturb the verdict of a jury. Appellate courts are equally as reluctant to sustain a trial court when it does take such action. I do not concur in the suggestion that a gross negligence standard be adopted. The distinction between gross and ordinary negligence is too vague and shadowy to be of any practical importance. The difficulty that courts and juries had in making this distinction in motor vehicle accident cases caused the General Assembly to abolish the gross negligence standard in guest cases. Virginia Code § 8.01-63.1 have no reason to believe that a jury or a court would find it any easier to make the distinction in defamation cases. I would adopt the New York Times standard which permits the recovery of compensatory damages for a defamatory statement only when such statement is made with knowledge that it is false or is made with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. And I would make the same standard applicable to the media and non-media defendants. Any lesser standard will inevitably have a chilling effect on free speech and the free press and will erode the safeguards protected by the Constitutions of the United States and Virginia. The majority opinion does limit the application of the negligent standard by requiring a trial judge to find as a matter of law that the defamatory statement “makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.” Although I approve the limitation, I fear that it will prove in practice to be one of form rather than substance. What is defamatory and when it is harmful are questions of fact. Judges will be just as hesitant to “take a case away” from the trier of the facts as they now are to set aside the verdict of a jury once it has been rendered. Because I am of opinion that the defendants in The Gazette, Inc., Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc., and Port Packet Corporation were guilty of simple negligence only, a standard which I would not adopt, I dissent from the decision affirming the compensatory-damage awards in the cases. I concur in the action of the majority in reversing the punitive-damage award in the Port Packet case. I did not participate in Fleming. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9539501. Public record. Not legal advice.