# Buchanan v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers

> Washington Supreme Court · October 9, 1980 · 94 Wash. 2d 508

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9538357

## Case

- **Full name:** Wesley D. Buchanan, Respondent, v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Et Al, Petitioners
- **Court:** Washington Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 9, 1980
- **Citations:** 94 Wash. 2d 508; 617 P.2d 1004; 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3461; 1980 Wash. LEXIS 1376
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Horowitz
- **Judges:** Brachtenbach, Rosellini, Horowitz
- **Cited by:** 31 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9538357

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the interpretation rendered in the previous case was "perhaps not adhering to the exact letter of the enactment"
- noting presumption of legislative acquiescence in judicial interpretation where statute is amended following court decision without change to relevant portions

## Opinion text

Horowitz, J.
(dissenting) — I must dissent from the majority's decision that the plaintiff's tort action against defendant union organizations and officials could not be precluded by application of RCW 49.32.070. RCW 49.32.070 requires "clear proof" of actual participation in, authorization, or ratification of acts before liability for actions taken in labor disputes can be assessed against unions, union officials, or union members. We should follow the United States Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers *515 v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 , 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966), that the federal statute from which RCW 49.32.070 was taken precludes civil tort actions based on common law agency grounds and therefore rule that the case be remanded to determine if the plaintiff's tort suit should be dismissed under the provisions of RCW 49.32.070.
The majority relies on Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Local 25, 62 Wn.2d 461 , 383 P.2d 504 (1963), in which this court held that RCW 49.32.070 does not prevent tort suits based on agency principles against unions and union officials. The Titus court cited the title to the act containing RCW 49.32.070, RCW 49.32, which states that the act limits "the powers of the courts of this state in the granting of restraining orders and injunctions . . . and in the trial and punishment for contempt for violation thereof”. Laws of 1933, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 7. The Titus court concluded that "the only logical conclusion" that could be drawn from the title "is that [RCW 49.32.070] is a limitation on the courts of this state in cases involving labor restraining orders and injunctions only and does not extend itself to the area of tort liability." Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Local 25, supra at 468. The majority's reliance on Titus is, however, clearly misplaced after Gibbs .
In Gibbs , the Supreme Court demonstrated the inappropriateness of the decision in Titus . In refusing to allow tort suits in labor disputes without clear proof of participation, authorization or ratification, the Gibbs court relied on the legislative history of the federal act that provided the model for our state. This history was extensively examined in United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 , 91 L. Ed. 973 , 67 S. Ct. 775 (1947), which the Gibbs court relied on in its decision. The Supreme Court in United Brotherhood concluded that the purpose of the provision was to "relieve organizations . . . and members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputation of guilt for lawless acts . . . without clear proof". (Footnote omitted.) United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, supra at 403. On this basis, the Gibbs court ruled *516 that the federal provision on which RCW 49.32.070 was modeled prohibited tort suits without clear proof of culpable activity on the part of union defendants.
Gibbs clearly should be followed in this case. The labor law provisions of RCW 49.32, including RCW 49.32.070, are identical to the federal statutes from which they were taken. Our task is to interpret and apply the legislative enactment, not to speculate upon the legislature's wisdom in enacting the statute, State v. Bryan, 93 Wn.2d 177, 180 , 606 P.2d 1228 (1980). The precedential value of federal interpretations of these provisions is clearly established and the court should acknowledge the error in Titus after Gibbs. See State v. Carroll, 81 Wn.2d 95, 109 , 500 P.2d 115 (1972) ("It is the rule that a statute adopted from another jurisdiction will carry the construction placed upon such statute by the other jurisdiction."); see American Radio Ass'n v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 891 , 47 Cal. Rptr. 419, 423 (1965). "An act should be so construed as to make uniform the law of those states which have enacted similar legislation." 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 373(a), at 866-67 (1953). See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 5201 (4th ed. 1972). This is particularly true when the state statute is "borrowed" from a federal source:
Where a legislature adopts a federal statute verbatim, the history of the law and the intent of congress when it adopted the provision have a bearing on the intent of the legislature, and it may be presumed that the legislature knew of the interpretation placed on the provision as expressed during the debates when before congress for adoption, had the same objectives in mind, and employed the statutory terms in the same sense.
(Footnotes omitted.) 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 371, at 859 (1953). Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 68-69 , 510 P.2d 1140 (1973) ("[W]hen a state borrows federal legislation it also borrows the construction placed upon such legislation by the federal courts."). Gibbs and United Brotherhood demonstrate the legislative intent to preclude tort actions in labor disputes *517 without clear proof of participation, authorization, or ratification, and they should compel adherence in this case.
The majority's failure to acknowledge Gibbs' precedent is particularly indefensible in light of the initial faulty reasoning of Titus . As was demonstrated by Gibbs' reliance on United Brotherhood, in Titus this court erred in refusing to follow the analysis of United Brotherhood. Although it is true, as noted in the Titus opinion, that United Brotherhood involved a criminal prosecution, the question addressed in United Brotherhood was the very one raised by Titus and by the instant case — whether clear proof of participation, authorization, or ratification is necessary to assess liability for acts undertaken in labor disputes. The Titus court erred in its dismissal of United Brotherhood on the grounds of its criminal nature, for the legislative history analysis undertaken was equálly relevant to civil and criminal suits. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra at 736-37.
In addition, the Titus court's reliance on the title of the act codified as RCW 49.32 is misplaced. The title of a bill is not intendéd as an index to its contents; all details of an enactment cannot be gleaned from its title and thus it is of little use in limiting the scope of a particular provision. Treffry v. Taylor, 67 Wn.2d 487, 491 , 408 P.2d 269 (1965). Particularly in this case, when the examined provision is only a portion of the bill that carries the title, great care must be taken in placing any reliance on the general heading of the enactment. See Spokane v. State, 198 Wash. 682, 690 , 89 P.2d 826 (1939) ("[T]he scope and intent of a statute is not controlled by the name given to it by way of designation or description."). In carrying out the legislature's intent, the court should instead have relied on the language of the particular provision considered and on the legislative history of its federal enactment, as set forth in United Brotherhood.
Finally, the majority does not claim that Titus correctly construed RCW 49.32.070. Indeed, the majority's only argument for its continued adherence to Titus is that the *518 legislature has had ample opportunity to change Titus' interpretation and has not done so. This argument is unpersuasive.
Both cases cited by the majority in support of the proposition that legislative inaction is probative of acquiescence in an earlier judicial interpretation are inapplicable. State v. Fenter, 89 Wn.2d 57 , 569 P.2d 67 (1977) and Daly v. Chapman, 85 Wn.2d 780 , 539 P.2d 831 (1975) involved statutes passed after judicial interpretation of earlier related enactments. The legislature could thus have been presumed to have taken notice of the related statutes and judicial interpretations thereof. That is not the case here, where the legislature has done nothing with regard to RCW 49.32.070 and nothing has called the rule of Titus to its attention. Nothing can be inferred from the legislature's failure to act with regard to RCW 49.32.070; legislatures express intent by enacting statutes, not by remaining silent. The majority's presumption is that the legislature is aware of its past enactments, and judicial interpretations thereof. Although there are occasions when that presumption is rightfully used as, for example, when we consider a statute later enacted, its significance is substantially diminished when there is no evidence that the past enactments and interpretations have been brought to the legislature's attention. Even in cases where amendatory bills have been considered and rejected by the legislature, the courts have been reluctant to rely on legislative inaction and silence in light of a later interpretation of a statute. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 , 8 L. Ed. 2d 590 , 82 S. Ct. 1354 (1962). The reenactment of a statute after judicial interpretation has also been insufficient to constitute legislative acquiescence in the earlier construction. "It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 , 90 L. Ed. 1084 , 66 S. Ct. 826 (1946).
There is no evidence in this case that this court's interpretation of RCW 49.32.070 in Titus was ever expressly considered by the legislature. Rather than presuming *519 acquiescence in an erroneous interpretation because of the legislature's silence, it would be as logical to conclude that no action was taken because the legislators presumed that the Supreme Court's decision 3 years later in Gibbs insured that RCW 49.32.070 would be properly interpreted to preclude tort suits of the type brought in this case without clear proof of participation, authorization or ratification. If we are to presume that the legislature knew of Titus , even though the case was not brought to its attention, it would be reasonable to presume that it knew of Gibbs and that the legislature assumed that this court would follow the general rule that the judicial interpretations of a statute borrowed from another jurisdiction would be followed in interpreting RCW 49.32.070. 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 371, 373(a); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 52.02 (1972).
In sum, the majority's reliance on legislative silence is unjustified:
Suppose the legislature refrains from amending a statute an uncertainty in which the courts of the jurisdiction have previously resolved. Would this constitute effective legislative approval of the judicial interpretation? The question becomes relevant whenever a court determines that it would be desirable to change the earlier interpretation. . . .
The first question is whether legislative silence can constitute effective legislative action. It seems obvious that a legislature cannot legislate effectively by not legislating at all. . . .
The second question is whether legislative silence has a probative value for inferring current legislative intentions. The answer to this also seems clear. In the realities of the legislative process, almost no reliable inference of current intent could be drawn. In many cases the legislature is unaware of the relevant court decision. Even where it is fully aware of it, there are often reasons other than approval why a legislature remains silent or inactive.
Alternatively, there may be no reason beyond the fact that the legislature is busy with what it considers more important public matters, or that the legislature does not *520 consider the matter important enough to engage the attention of the whole legislative process. Certainly, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Mann Act in Caminetti v. United States [ 242 U.S. 470 , 61 L. Ed. 442 , 37 S. Ct. 192 (1916)] was considered a perversion of congressional intent, and yet political considerations intervened to head off corrective legislation. There could hardly be less reputable legislative material than legislative silence.
(Footnotes omitted.) R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 181-82 (1975).
This court should not attempt to avoid its interpretative duties by relying on the legislature's inaction in light of a decision, Titus, which is now revealed to be clearly erroneous by Gibbs . Reconsideration of the provisions of RCW 49.32.070 in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gibbs should require us to reverse the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for summary judgment and remand the case for decision under the standards of RCW 49.32.070.
I therefore dissent.
Utter, C.J., and Dolliver, J., concur with Horowitz, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9538357. Public record. Not legal advice.