# Lenrich Associates v. Heyda

> Oregon Supreme Court · December 14, 1972 · 264 Or. 122

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9537247

## Case

- **Full name:** LENRICH ASSOCIATES, Appellant, v. HEYDA Et Al, Respondents
- **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 14, 1972
- **Citations:** 264 Or. 122; 504 P.2d 112; 1972 Ore. LEXIS 352
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Holman
- **Judges:** O'Connell, McAllister, Denecke, Holman, Howell, Bryson
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9537247

## Opinion text

*135 HOLMAN, J.,
concurring.
It is impossible to read Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner ① and be certain whether the majority opinion is correct in interpreting it as engaging in a balancing process between constitutionally protected Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment property rights on the one hand and the First Amendment right of free speech on the other, or whether Tanner should be viewed, as the dissenting and the other concurring opinion view it, as referring to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments only as emblematic of the importance of property rights generally. Tanner seems to read as the majority of the court interprets it. However, no one can be certain of the intention of the Supreme Court of the United States until the opinion is clarified.
I prefer not to guess and it is unnecessary for me to do so. If Tanner was merely an evaluation of nonconstitutionally protected property rights as opposed to the claimed First Amendment right of free speech, I would come to the same conclusion in this case under the provisions of the Oregon Constitution as the Supreme Court of the United States came to in Tanner under the United States Constitution. The location of the First Amendment activity was completely enclosed within the four walls and the roof of a building which was entirely devoted to business use. The defendants could have effectively carried out their First Amendment activities outside the entrances to the building, and their necessity for coming within plaintiff’s building was non-existent.
407 US 551 , 92 S Ct 2219 , 33 L Ed 2d 131 (1972).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9537247. Public record. Not legal advice.