# City of Sacramento v. State of California

> California Supreme Court · January 29, 1990 · 50 Cal. 3d 51

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9536489

## Case

- **Full name:** CITY OF SACRAMENTO Et Al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Et Al., Defendants and Respondents
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** January 29, 1990
- **Citations:** 50 Cal. 3d 51; 266 Cal. Rptr. 139; 785 P.2d 522; 1990 Cal. LEXIS 148
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Kaufman
- **Judges:** Eagleson, Kaufman
- **Cited by:** 86 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9536489

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that parties could relitigate whether the State was required to subvent costs incurred by local governments
- applying the public interest exception where large numbers of citizens might otherwise be adversely affected by unjust tax impositions

## Opinion text

KAUFMAN, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the judgment. Given this court’s decision in County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 38 , 729 P.2d 202 ], I am compelled to agree that the obligation imposed on local governments by the 1978 state unemployment insurance legislation is not a “new program or higher level of service” within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6, of the California Constitution, and that for this reason the state is not constitutionally obligated to provide a subvention of funds to reimburse the unemployment insurance costs of local governments. I respectfully dissent, however, from the additional conclusion, stated in part V of the majority opinion, that these unemployment insurance costs are “mandates of . . . the federal government” and therefore exempt from the state and local government appropriation limits of article XIII B and from property taxation limits imposed by statute. In reaching this additional conclusion the majority decides an issue not raised by the parties and completely outside the scope of this action. As so often happens when a court reaches beyond the confines of the case before it to render a gratuitous advisory opinion, the majority decides the issue incorrectly.
All too frequently in recent years (see, e.g., S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 345, fn. 1 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 ]) this court, in its misguided zeal to provide enlightenment, has reached out to decide an issue not tendered by the parties. The majority’s failure to exercise proper judicial restraint in the instant case is another example of this trend and one I find particularly disturbing since it violates a fundamental and venerable tenet of judicial practice—i.e., “A court will not decide a constitutional question unless such construction is absolutely necessary.” (Estate of Johnson (1903) 139 Cal. 532, 534 [ 73 P. 424 ]; accord, People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 888 , 547 P.2d 1000 ]; Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 65 [ 195 P.2d 1 ].) The federal mandate issue which the majority here decides, because it turns on the proper construction of article XIII B, section 9, of our state Constitution, is a constitutional issue. Using this case to resolve that issue is, to my mind, indefensible.
To see just how far the majority has wandered from the issues essential to the proper resolution of this case, one need only point out that this action *78 was not brought to settle a dispute about taxation or appropriation limits, nor has this court been informed that any such dispute exists. Rather, this action was brought to enforce the holding in City of Sacramento v. State of California (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 182 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 258 ] (Sacramento I), that the state is constitutionally obligated to reimburse the unemployment insurance costs of local governments. The governmental entities litigating this proceeding have not sought a judicial determination of the 1978 unemployment insurance legislation’s effect on their statutory or constitutional taxing or spending limits, nor have they raised any issue regarding whether unemployment insurance costs are federally mandated for any purpose. The federal mandate issue was first injected into the case by this court when we requested additional briefing on the questions whether the unemployment insurance costs of local governments are federally mandated under article XIII B, section 9, of the state Constitution and, if so, whether this conclusion necessarily exempts the state from any obligation it might otherwise have to reimburse local governments for these costs.
The majority’s federal mandate discussion does not even provide an alternative ground for the holding denying reimbursement of local governments’ unemployment insurance costs, for the majority purports to decide whether unemployment insurance costs are federally mandated without deciding whether resolution of this issue has any bearing on entitlement to reimbursement (see maj. opn., ante, p. 71, fn. 16). The majority’s only justification for deciding whether unemployment insurance costs are federally mandated is that the issue has “important implications” inasmuch as federally mandated costs are “exempt from a local government’s statutory taxation limit (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 2271)” and “from the constitutional spending limit of any affected entity, state or local (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 9(b)).” (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 70-71.) But the present case is an inappropriate vehicle for deciding these weighty issues since neither the state nor the local entities have any reason to contest the other’s exemptions from spending or taxation limits. In other words, the parties now before us are not adverse on these issues and so have not defined and argued opposing points of view with the vigor and thoroughness essential to proper judicial resolution of complex legal questions, particularly those of constitutional magnitude. Those who might have argued in favor of including unemployment insurance costs in the taxing and spending limits—for example, the proponents of the initiative measure by which article XIII B was enacted—are not represented in this proceeding.
Were the issue properly presented in this case, I would conclude that the unemployment insurance costs are not federally mandated. The text of a constitution “should be construed in accordance with the natural and ordinary meaning of its words.” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. *79 State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 208, 245 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 583 P.2d 1281 ].) The language at issue here excludes from the definition of “appropriations subject to limitation” those appropriations “required for purposes of complying with mandates of the courts or the federal government which, without discretion, require an expenditure for additional services or which unavoidably make the providing of existing services more costly.” (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 9, subd. (b), italics added.)
The meaning of this language is clear; to look beyond the text for some other meaning is both unnecessary and improper under accepted rules of constitutional interpretation. (See State Board of Education v. Levit (1959) 52 Cal.2d 441, 462 [ 343 P.2d 8 ]; People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182-183 [ 217 P.2d 1 ].) A “mandate” is “an order, command [or] charge.” (Xth Olympiad Com. v. American Olym. Assn. (1935) 2 Cal.2d 600, 604 [ 42 P.2d 1023 ]; see also, Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901, 908 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 251 , 559 P.2d 606 ] [“mandatory duty” is “an obligatory duty which a governmental entity is required to perform”]; Bridgman v. American Book Co. (1958) 12 Misc.2d 63, 66 [ 173 N.Y.S.2d 502, 506 ] [“mandate” is “a command, order or direction . . . which a person is bound to obey”].) The mandates to which the constitutional provision at issue refers are those “of the courts or the federal government.” The coercive force of court mandates is, of course, the force of law. That “mandates of . . . the federal government” are similarly limited to those obligations imposed by force of federal law is shown not only by the term “mandate” itself but also by the terms “without discretion” and “unavoidably,” which plainly exclude any form of inducement using political or economic pressure rather than legal compulsion.
Laws limiting governmental appropriations and indebtedness have traditionally exempted two categories of expenditures: those required to meet emergencies and those required to satisfy duties or mandates imposed by law. (See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Byram (1951) 36 Cal.2d 694, 698-700 [ 227 P.2d 4 ]; County of Los Angeles v. Payne (1937) 8 Cal. 2d 563, 569-575 [ 66 P.2d 658 ]; State v. City Council of City of Helena (1939) 108 Mont. 347 [ 90 P.2d 514, 516 ]; Raynor v. King County (1940) 2 Wn.2d 199 [ 97 P.2d 696, 707 ].) The latter category has been interpreted as including only those obligations compelled by force of law, as opposed to economic or political necessity or expedience. (See County of Los Angeles v. Byram, supra, at pp. 698-700 ; County of Los Angeles v. Payne, supra, at pp. 573-574 .) Article XIII B of the California Constitution follows the pattern of other similar laws; it provides exemptions for emergency appropriations in section 3, subdivision (c), and for legal duties or “mandates” in section 9, subdivision (b). I see no basis for concluding that the term “mandate,” which in the context of government debt and appropriation limitations has traditionally *80 meant a duty imposed by force of law, has suddenly acquired a novel and more expansive meaning in section 9. On the contrary, the drafters of section 9 appear to have taken pains to avoid any such interpretation.
As stated in Sacramento I, “The concept of federal mandates ... is defined in section 9 of article XIII B. Subdivision (b) of that section excludes from a governmental entity’s appropriation limit ‘[appropriations required for purposes of complying with mandates of. . . the federal government which, without discretion, require an expenditure’ by the governmental entity. (Italics added.) As contemplated by article XIII B, section 9, a federal mandate is one pursuant to which the federal government imposes a cost upon a governmental entity, and the entity has no discretion to refuse the cost. Chapter 2 [the 1978 unemployment insurance legislation] was not a federal mandate within this constitutional definition, as the State had the discretion to participate or not in the federal unemployment insurance system.” (Sacramento I, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d 182, 197 , italics in original.) Giving the constitutional language its usual and ordinary meaning, I agree with the Court of Appeal that federal law “mandates” an expenditure only if the expenditure is legally compelled, and not if the federal law merely provides economic or political inducements, no matter how powerful or coercive. Since it is undisputed that the state was under no legal compulsion to enact the 1978 unemployment insurance legislation, the burdens of that legislation are not “mandates of . . . the federal government.”
In support of its contrary conclusion, the majority reasons as follows: (1) when article XIII B of the California Constitution was drafted and enacted, the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had been construed to prohibit Congress from imposing costs on state and local governments; (2) as a result, virtually all federal laws imposing costs on state and local governments did so through “carrot and stick” incentive programs rather than by direct legal compulsion; and (3) the exemption for “mandates of . . . the federal government” must be construed to encompass at least some of these incentive programs because otherwise it would be almost entirely superfluous. I find each of these points highly questionable, if not demonstratively unsound.
First, the Tenth Amendment has never been interpreted as entirely prohibiting the federal government from imposing costs on state and local government. Rather, National League of Cities v. Usery (1976) 426 U.S. 833 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 245 , 96 S.Ct. 2465 ] defined an exception to the broad sweep of Congress’s commerce clause authority. Under this exception, “traditional governmental functions” of state and local governments were protected from direct and intrusive federal regulation. ( 426 U.S. at p. 852 [49 L.Ed.2d at pp. 257-258].) As explained in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit *81 Auth. (1985) 469 U.S. 528, 538-547 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 1016, 1025-1032 , 105 S.Ct. 1005 ], the result was an inconsistent patchwork of decisions upholding or striking laws depending on whether the regulated activities were perceived by the court as being traditionally associated with state or local government or constituting “attributes of state sovereignty.” Thus, a significant number of laws imposing costs on state and local governments survived Tenth Amendment scrutiny even before the decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., supra. (See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming (1983) 460 U.S. 226 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 18 , 103 S.Ct. 1054 ] [holding state and local government employee retirement policies subject to federal age discrimination regulations]; see generally, Skover, “Phoenix Rising” and Federalism Analysis (1986) 13 Hastings Const.L.Q. 271, 286-288.) More importantly, however, I see no reason to assume that the drafters of article XIII B intended that the federal mandate exemption would have broad application, encompassing a large number of federal programs. Rather, construing the exemption narrowly seems entirely consistent with the probable intent of those who drafted the provision.
The test proposed by the majority for identifying those incentive programs which qualify as “mandates of ... the federal government” will require an extensive factual inquiry into the practical consequences of noncompliance with the federal law. It will be burdensome to apply and its outcome will be difficult to predict. Besides being wholly unnecessary to resolution of this case, and violating the probable intent of the voters who enacted article XIII B of the California Constitution, 1 the majority’s discussion of the federal mandate issue is certain to generate more difficulties than it resolves.
Those voters no doubt will be upset to learn that their tax dollars will be dissipated in litigation to determine such metaphysical questions as whether a decision to participate in a federal program was “truly voluntary.”

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9536489. Public record. Not legal advice.