# Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence of the Ducor Union School District

> California Supreme Court · April 30, 1979 · 24 Cal. 3d 167

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9535637

## Case

- **Full name:** WARREN RANKINS, as Superintendent-Principal, Etc., Et Al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE DUCOR UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT Et Al., Defendants and Appellants; THOMAS EDWARD BYARS, Real Party in Interest and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 30, 1979
- **Citations:** 24 Cal. 3d 167; 154 Cal. Rptr. 907; 593 P.2d 852; 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9234; 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 925; 1979 Cal. LEXIS 249
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Clark
- **Judges:** Newman, Clark
- **Cited by:** 27 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9535637

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that a teacher was wrongfully threatened with discharge for taking religious holidays and holding that "article I, § 8 forbids disqualification of employees for religious practices unless reasonable accommodation by the employer is impossible without undue hardship”
- recognizing as secular the purpose of “promot[ing] equal employment opportunities for members of all religious faiths”
- holding accommodation to be considered
- noting reasoning in federal courts

## Opinion text

CLARK, J.
— I dissent.
However the majority rationalize the factual record in this case, it remains clear that Thomas Byars was absent without permission from five to ten school days in each of the four school years immediately preceding
*179 his dismissal as a public school teacher. Byars was advised on numerous occasions that his contemplated absences on normal school days would not be excused, yet he deemed he had a superior, unilateral right to not perform duties he had contracted with the school district to perform. No one would challenge the propriety of Byars’ discharge on these facts, absent his claimed constitutional right to exercise his religious beliefs. 1
The majority hold that Byars’ dismissal based on absences due to his religious practices caused him to be “disqualified from . . . pursuing . . . [an] employment because of. . . creed” (see Cal.Const., art. I, § 8). (Ante, p. 172.) The majority curiously arrive at such conclusion on an analysis of cases arising out of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 notwithstanding the fact that Byars is not pursuing any remedy under that act. The net result of such analysis appears to be that an employer is required to make “reasonable accommodation” {ante, p. 174) of an employee’s religious practices. The California constitutional prohibition against disqualification from employment because of creed, according to the majority, should be similarly construed to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious practices. “Just as the First Amendment protects religious practices from interference in the absence of a compelling state interest... article I, section 8 forbids disqualification of employees for religious practices unless reasonable accommodation by the employer is impossible without undue hardship.” {Ante, p. 174.)
The majority seriously err in treating the issue as if we deal with a law compelling employers to accommodate employees in their religious practices. We deal with no such compulsion, either statutory or constitu-tional. The constitutional provision relied upon by the majority deals only with disqualification from entering or pursuing a profession because of “creed.” The ecclesiastical meaning of “creed” is “A brief, authoritative *180 doctrinal formula, beginning with such words as ‘Credo,’ ‘Credimus,’ T believe,’ ‘We believe,’ intended to define at certain points what is held by a congregation, a synod, or a church to be true and essential, and exclude what is held to be false belief. .. .” (Websters New Internal. Diet. (2d ed. unabridged) p. 622.) 2 Thus article I, section 8 in clear language is a prohibition against disqualification from entering a profession solely on the basis of beliefs and does not purport to afford an employee, as the majority would hold, any right to be accommodated in the practice of his beliefs. The district has not disqualified Byars from entering or pursuing the teaching profession because of his “creed.” There is no requirement in the constitutional provision that it must reasonably or otherwise accommodate Byars in practicing his creed regardless of the lack of undue or other hardship the district may suffer by such accommodation. The right Byars asserts must be established, if at all, by considerations not dependent on article I, section 8.
The question presented is whether Byars’ termination of employment constitutes a violation of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the federal Constitution or of article I, section 4 of the California Constitution. 3 It was early established that while laws “cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” (Reynolds v. United States (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 166 [ 25 L.Ed. 244, 250 ]; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 [ 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1217-1218 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 128 A.L.R. 1352 ].) In speaking for a majority of this court in Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles (1945) 27 Cal.2d 232, 242 [ 163 P.2d 704 ], Justice Traynor stated: “Religious liberty ‘embraces two concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.’ ” In Í963 the Supreme Court ruled that where it is claimed a state has infringed the free exercise clause, it must be established that not only has the exercise of religion been burdened, but that there is also no compelling state interest justifying the burden. (Sherbert v. Verner (1903) 374 U.S. 398, 403 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 970 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 ].)
In Stimpel v. State Personnel Board (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 206 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 797 ] (cert. den., 400 U.S. 952 [ 27 L.Ed.2d 258 , 91 S.Ct. 245 ]), the employment of a state inspector was terminated because he declined to *181 perform services, as required by his employment, on his Sabbath. In holding that the free exercise clause had not been offended because other employment within his profession was available to the plaintiff, the court stated: “The proliferation of religions with an infinite variety of tenets would, if the state is required as an employer to accommodate each employee’s particular scruples, place an intolerable burden upon the state. We conclude that if a person has religious scruples which conflict with the requirements of a particular job with the state, he should not accept employment or, having accepted, he should not be heard to complain if he is discharged for failing to fulfill his duties.” (Id., at pp. 209-210.)
This court has approved the foregoing quoted language. In Hildebrand v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 765 [ 140 Cal. Rptr. 151 , 566 P.2d 1297 ], unemployment benefits were denied an employee who — after accepting employment — became a member of the Worldwide Church of God and, like Byars, refused to work on the holy days of that church. When her employment was terminated she sought unemployment insurance benefits. A majority of this court held plaintiff had left work voluntarily without good cause. In principle, Hildebrand is indistinguishable from the present case. Each employee became a member of the Worldwide Church of God after accepting employment, each thereafter refused to perform services on normal work days declared to be holy days by the church, each was warned that continued adherence to the practice would result in termination of employment, and the employment of each was eventually terminated for that reason. 4 These circumstances were deemed decisive in Hildebrand and, in factually distinguishing Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S. 398 , relied on by today’s majority, the court stated: “In the matter before us, the condition was knowingly and voluntarily accepted, work commenced, and a change of heart thereafter ensued, doubtless motivated by the very deepest and most sincere of impulses.” (Hildebrand v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 19 Cal.3d 765, 770-771 .)
If Byars’ exercise of religion is burdened by conditions of his employment, that burden is justified by the interest — in fact, the duty — of the district in maintaining a proper educational program to the end of *182 insuring the reading, writing and other skills of students exposed to the program. No legitimate claim can be made that the interest in accomplishing such an objective is not a compelling state interest (cf. Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S. 398, 403 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 970 ]) and, as stated, we must give effect to the trial court finding that Byars’ absences had a substantial detrimental effect on that program.
It seems clear for the foregoing reasons that the termination of Byars’ employment is not impermissible under the free exercise clause of either the First Amendment of the federal Constitution or article I, section 4 of the California Constitution.
I am further at a loss to understand how the majority decision in this case is philosophically consistent with that in Fox v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 22 Cal.3d 792 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 587 P.2d 663 ]. In that case the majority held that the city could not light its windows in a manner to form a Christian cross, as to do so constituted a constitutionally impermissible state involvement with religion. (See Fox v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.3d 792 , dis. opn. of Richardson, J. at p. 817.) The majority stated there that “[gjovernments must commit themselves to ‘a position of neutrality’ whenever ‘the relationship between man and religion’ is affected” (id., at p. 798), and that we must guard “against every governmental intrusion, large or small, into the inner sanctum of conscience” (id., conc. opn. of Bird, C. J., at p. 813). Now the majority hold that the state must not be neutral but must get involved with matters of conscience by making accommodations to those who wish to practice their religions at times they have contracted to perform services for the state — an involvement of much greater substance than that of Fox . I am aware that the majority will attempt to explain their divergent positions on the ground that the establishment of a religion was at issue in Fox , while it is the free exercise of religion which is at issue here. In actuality, however, the exercise of religion mandated by the majority today constitutes a law respecting an establishment of Mr. Byars’ religion, rendering the state no longer neutral in the relationship between man and his religion.
I would affirm the judgment.
Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied May 30, 1979. Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Although the majority rely on administrative findings to discount the impact of Byars’ absences on the district’s educational program (ante, p. 17T), the trial court — whose judgment is the subject of this appeal — expressly found that Byars’ absences and the use of substitute teachers had a substantial detrimental effect on the educational program as it affected concerned students. Thé majority thus assume the role of factfinder and, contrary to trial court findings, conclude that because each teacher is allowed at least 10 days of paid leave each year for illness or personal necessity, a school district must allow an additional 5 to 10 days a year of unpaid leave for religious purposes since such amount of unpaid leave would not be “unreasonably burdensome.” (Ante, p. 175.) At what point the total of a teacher’s absences in a given school year becomes “unreasonably burdensome” is surely a matter for the trier of fact and not for the reviewing court.
Another meaning of “creed” is “Any formula or confession of religious faith; a system of religious belief, esp. as expressed or expressible in a definitive statement; sometimes a summary of principles or set of opinions professed or adhered to in science or politics, or the like.....” (Id.)
Article I, section 4, provides in pertinent part: “Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed.”
The majority attempt to distinguish Hildebrand on the ground that “Byars at no time voluntarily accepted working conditions conflicting with his religion .. . .” (Ante, p. 176.) However, the majority further acknowledge that Byars was hired by the district iñ f9‘69" “to render services ... for such length of time during the school year as the Governing Board of the School District may direct.” (Ante, p. 170.) Byars accepted all work assignments until the 1971-1972 school year.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9535637. Public record. Not legal advice.