# Commonwealth v. DeJohn

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 17, 1979 · 486 Pa. 32

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9535585

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Jill Y. DeJOHN, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 17, 1979
- **Citations:** 486 Pa. 32; 403 A.2d 1283; 1979 Pa. LEXIS 572
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Roberts
- **Judges:** Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino, Larsen
- **Cited by:** 149 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9535585

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that, contrary to Miller and Smith , under the Pennsylvania Constitution, a person retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records even though a bank employee would have free access to view the contents contained therein
- holding that, contrary to Miller and Smith, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, a person retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records even though a bank employee would have free access to view the contents contained therein
- holding that under the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, Section 8, defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his bank record, despite not having such an interest under the Fourth Amendment
- recognizing under Article I, Section 8 an expectation of privacy in bank records
- holding that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his bank record under Article I, Section 8, despite not having such an interest under the Fourth Amendment

## Opinion text

ROBERTS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the Court that appellant’s conviction on the charge of attempted extortion should be affirmed.
I also agree with Mr. Justice Manderino that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction against appellant for murder of the third degree. Since that view, however, does not prevail, I conclude that in the alternative appellant is at least entitled to a new trial because appellant’s prior bad acts and criminal conduct were improperly admitted, over *51 objection, into evidence. I join the majority in granting a new trial.
Evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal conduct or other bad acts is highly prejudicial and generally is not admissible. The Commonwealth, however, argues that its evidence that appellant engaged in forgery and attempted extortion was admissible since it was introduced to establish appellant’s motive for the crime with which she was charged. See e. g., Commonwealth v. Stanley, 484 Pa. 2 , 398 A.2d 631 (1979); Commonwealth v. Roman, 465 Pa. 515 , 351 A.2d 214 (1976); McCormick, Evidence, 2d ed. §§ 190 et seq.
In support of this argument, the Commonwealth offers as a possible motive appellant’s fear that her husband might learn of the extent of their debts. On this view, appellant’s inability in the days before the murder to raise sufficient funds to meet their financial needs made the unwanted revelation appear imminent and provoked appellant’s murder of her husband. On this theory, only unsuccessful attempts to raise funds would provide appellant with a motive for murder; successful attempts would be irrelevant. And yet, arguing that it fell within the “motive exception,” the prosecution introduced evidence meant to show that three months before DeJohn’s death, appellant successfully obtained a bank loan by forging her husband’s signature on the loan application. The evidence of deceit in the bank transaction could serve only to impeach appellant’s character and improperly prejudice the jury against appellant. Given the inapplicability of the Commonwealth’s theory of motive to this successful attempt at raising funds, it is clear that the prejudicial effect of the evidence of forgery significantly outweighed its probative value. The evidence of forgery was not relevant and its introduction constituted reversible. error.
The Commonwealth also introduced evidence that appellant unsuccessfully attempted to extort money from a neighbor several days before DeJohn’s death. The Commonwealth argues that the failure of this attempt to raise funds provoked the killing. But the Commonwealth has failed to *52 present any evidence that the victim’s expected response to disclosure of his financial situation would have been in any way so extraordinary as to provoke his wife to murder him to avoid it. Evidence of prior crimes is only admissible where there is a logical connection between the two crimes such that knowledge of the perpetrator of the former establishes the perpetrator of the latter. E.g., Stanley, supra; Commonwealth v. Patterson, 484 Pa. 374 , 399 A.2d 123 (1979). The record does not establish that appellant and her husband had an unsuccessful marriage, or that the debts of the DeJohns were caused by appellant alone. Rather, it appears from the record that the difficult financial position of appellant and her husband arose from the relatively extravagant spending habits shared by husband and wife. On this record there is no logical connection between the two crimes of which appellant was accused. Thus the extremely prejudicial evidence of attempted extortion is not relevant to determining the identity of the murderer of Michael DeJohn and its admission also was reversible error.
The presence in this record of reversible evidentiary errors makes it unnecessary to decide whether the customer of a bank has a protectable interest in the privacy of his bank accounts, apparently a constitutional question of first impression in this jurisdiction. Because the majority addresses this question, however, I wish to note my disagreement with the majority’s analysis. Certainly bank customers have standing to challenge the introduction of bank records into evidence against them. The nature of the commercial relationship between banks and their customers is such that a customer’s interest in the integrity of his bank account is in my view something less than a constitutional right of privacy and something more than a confidential relationship. What is necessary to protect the interests of all involved is a rule not only in harmony with the economic and commercial necessities of today, but one which is sensitive, as well, to the legitimate needs of those charged with enforcing the laws for access to commercial banking records. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) *53 (probable cause not necessary for lawful police stop) and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (arbitrary police stop of vehicles unlawful). The protection of the interests of the depositors, financial institutions, and effective law enforcement demands that bank records be made available upon compliance with proper legal process. Thus, at this stage of our commercial and jurisprudential development this Court can, in an appropriate case, fashion a decisional rule which protects both the need for confidential and responsible treatment of the depositor’s account and the need for effective law enforcement.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9535585. Public record. Not legal advice.