# Lake Arrowhead Community Club, Inc. v. Looney

> Washington Supreme Court · April 13, 1989 · 112 Wash. 2d 288

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9534128

## Case

- **Full name:** Lake Arrowhead Community Club, Inc., Petitioner, v. William Looney, Et Al, Respondents
- **Court:** Washington Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 13, 1989
- **Citations:** 112 Wash. 2d 288; 770 P.2d 1046
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brachtenbach
- **Judges:** Durham, Brachtenbach, Dore, Callow, Utter, Dolliver, Pearson, Andersen, Smith
- **Cited by:** 21 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9534128

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that affirmative obligation to pay money survived tax sale

## Opinion text

Brachtenbach, J.
(concurring) — I fully concur with the majority and write only to emphasize that the dissent concerns itself with an issue which is not remotely part of this case.
The dissent attacks the validity of the lien which is provided for in the bylaws and which was ordered foreclosed if the obligation was not paid. The dissent is the only one raising that issue. The lien issue is not raised by the parties, it is not briefed and was no part of the proceedings below.
*298 On appeal from the Superior Court to the Court of Appeals, the defendant (respondent here) raised two issues: (1) Did the covenant obligation survive the tax sale?; and (2) If the obligation did survive, should the trial court have entered a personal judgment or is the association's relief "limited to foreclosure of its lien?" Brief of Appellant, at 1-2.
If appellant-defendant below took any position regarding the lien, it was that the lien was the only remedy which would survive the tax sale. Implicit in that position is an admission that the lien was valid for this case.
When we consider what issue is before the court on the petition for review, the dissent's theory becomes even more irrelevant. The Court of Appeals never reached the personal versus lien obligation. The petition for review raises only one issue, to wit: whether the covenant obligation survived the tax sale. Petition for Review, at 1.
The issue raised in the petition for review is the permissible scope of our review. RAP 13.7(b) states in part: "the Supreme Court will review only the questions raised in . . . the petition for review and the answer, unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise upon the granting of the . . . petition. "
An answer to the petition was filed. It did not raise any issue about the lien. Our order granting the petition did not preserve the issue. The statute, RCW 65.08.030, relied upon by the dissent, was never cited by anyone, in briefs or oral argument.
The only theory defendant presented in oral argument about a lien is the one disposed of by the majority. Footnote 2.
The dissent's frolic and detour is particularly unwarranted and fraught with potential error. The subject of lien law is often quite technical in nature. The type of lien is of significance. There are potential issues of fact, such as assumption or actual knowledge which are not considered in the facts in the record.
*299 In short, the dissent writes about an issue which is not raised, which therefore is not in the case, which is not briefed, and which potentially has great significance. It is a disservice to the law to render an advisory opinion under these circumstances, even in dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9534128. Public record. Not legal advice.