# People v. Brooks > Illinois Supreme Court · June 17, 1999 · 187 Ill. 2d 91 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9533903 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. TERRENCE BROOKS, Appellant - **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court - **Decided:** June 17, 1999 - **Citations:** 187 Ill. 2d 91; 240 Ill. Dec. 607; 718 N.E.2d 88; 1999 Ill. LEXIS 678 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Freeman - **Judges:** Bilandic, Freeman, Harrison, McMORROW, Rathje - **Cited by:** 246 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9533903 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding that the witness had an “adequate opportunity to view the assailant,” even though the shooting lasted only “ ‘a second or so’ ” because the witness testified that “he had known defendant *** for a number of years,” reasoning that this was the “strongest factor weighing… - stating that even if a defendant can meet his burden and prove that an identification was suggestive, the State may overcome this showing by clear and convincing evidence that the eyewitness identified the defendant based on his or her independent recollection of the incident - finding a witness’s prior acquaintance with a suspect was “particularly important” and that it rendered other factors, including the length of time between the offense and the identification and suggestive police procedures, “less relevant” - finding that the testimony at the pretrial hearing and at trial provided a sufficient account of events to determine whether the identification had an independent basis, rendering it unnecessary to remand for further proceedings - stating that the witness’s acquaintance with the defendant was “the strongest factor” supporting the witness’s identification of the defendant, where the witness had known the defendant for about four years ## Opinion text CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: I concur in the disposition of today’s case. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s convoluted treatment of defendant’s claim that the court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to suppress Brenda Hall’s identification of him. During the pretrial hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, Hall testified that she had identified defendant from a photo array shown to her by an assistant State’s Attorney. According to Hall’s testimony, no one at the State’s Attorney’s office said anything to her before she viewed the photographs. 187 Ill. 2d at 101. Defendant presented no further evidence regarding Hall’s identification at the pretrial hearing, and the court denied his motion as noted by the majority. At trial, Hall testified for the first time that the name “Terry Brooks” appeared on the back of the photograph she had identified. She also indicated that she had seen the photographs two times before identifying defendant’s photo. Defendant now argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress Hall’s identification. I agree with the majority that, at the pretrial hearing, defendant failed to meet his burden of showing suggestive procedures. 187 Ill. 2d at 126. On appeal, defendant also relies upon Hall’s trial testimony, claiming it proves that the police used suggestive identification tactics. In considering this issue, the majority first embarks upon an analysis of when a reviewing court may or may not consider trial evidence in reviewing a pretrial motion to suppress. It subsequently concludes that we should not consider Hall’s trial testimony in this case, “particularly” because defendant failed to seek reconsideration of his motion to suppress at the time the testimony was introduced. 187 Ill. 2d at 127. Then, notwithstanding this conclusion, the majority proceeds to do exactly what it has just denounced, and reviews the suppression decision in light of Hall’s testimony, ultimately deciding that, in any event, it fails to warrant reversal of the trial court’s decision. 187 Ill. 2d at 127-28. I would dispose of this issue simply by stating that defendant has waived his right to rely on Hall’s trial testimony by failing to bring it to the attention of the trial court. It is fundamental that defendant, as the party bearing the initial burden of proof on a motion to suppress (Enis, 163 Ill. 2d at 398), must alert the trial court to any evidence which emerges in support of his motion. If the evidence indicates that suggestive tactics were used, the State may then attempt to overcome such a showing with clear and convincing proof that the witness had an independent recollection of defendant. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d at 398. At trial, however, defendant simply let Hall’s testimony pass without renewing or seeking reconsideration of his pretrial motion to suppress, or even specifically raising the matter in his post-trial motion (see People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 340-41 (1989); People v. Evans, 259 Ill. App. 3d 650, 654 (1994)). Clearly, he cannot now assert that testimony as a basis of error. Additionally, for this same reason, it is inappropriate for the majority to reach the merits of defendant’s argument on this issue. Rather, if the majority is in fact holding the matter waived, any further analysis should follow the test set forth by this court in People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (1988). See People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 523-31 (1998) (Freeman, C.J., & McMorrow, J., specially concurring). JUSTICES BILANDIC and McMORROW join in this special concurrence. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9533903. Public record. Not legal advice.