# People v. Coronado

> California Supreme Court · December 21, 1995 · 12 Cal. 4th 145

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9533484

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTONIO CORONADO, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 21, 1995
- **Citations:** 12 Cal. 4th 145; 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77; 95 Daily Journal DAR 16953; 906 P.2d 1232; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9788; 1995 Cal. LEXIS 7345
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kennard
- **Judges:** Baxter, Kennard
- **Cited by:** 283 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9533484

## Opinion text

KENNARD, J., Concurring.
May a single prior felony conviction for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); hereafter DUI) be used both to elevate a new DUI offense from a misdemeanor to a felony and to support a prior prison term enhancement (that is, the imposition of an additional and consecutive prison term when the person committing a felony has previously served a term in state prison)? The majority holds that it may. I agree.
In my dissent in the companion case of People v. Baird (1995) 12 Cal.4th 126, 136 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 65 , 906 P.2d 1220 ] I explain that there is a general rule of statutory construction, based on a reasonable inference of legislative intent, that a single fact may not be used both to prove a crime and to increase the punishment for that crime. And I explain there that this inference of legislative intent is strongest when the fact that is an element of the offense will, in every instance, also satisfy the requirements for the increased punishment. The inference becomes weaker, and the rule ceases to apply, if the fact that is an element of the offense does not frequently or typically also satisfy the requirements for the increased punishment.
Here, the majority persuades me that persons convicted of DUI do not frequently or typically serve prison terms for this offense. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 154-155.) Therefore, I agree that we should not infer a legislative intent to preclude use of a single prior DUI conviction both to elevate a new DUI offense from a misdemeanor to a felony and to support a prior prison term enhancement.
I also agree, for the reasons stated by the majority, that using a single prior DUI conviction for these two distinct purposes does not violate the multiple punishment proscription of Penal Code section 654.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9533484. Public record. Not legal advice.