# Velazquez Ex Rel. Velazquez v. Jiminez > Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 29, 2002 · 172 N.J. 240 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9533329 ## Case - **Full name:** Conor Velazquez, an Infant by His Mother and Natural Guardian, Charmaine Velazquez, Charmaine Velazquez, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Conor Velazquez, and Jose Velazquez, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Conor Velazquez, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Teresa Jiminez, M.D., St. Peter’s Medical Center, Ellen Maak, R.N., Jeanine Healy, R.N., and John Does, M.D., Defendants, and Angela C. Ranzini, M.D., Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey - **Decided:** May 29, 2002 - **Citations:** 172 N.J. 240; 798 A.2d 51; 2002 N.J. LEXIS 733 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Verniero - **Judges:** Long, Verniero - **Cited by:** 44 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9533329 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that Good Samaritan immunity does not extend to emergencies in hospitals because “the fundamental problem facing a Good Samaritan on the street (the ability to do little more than render first aid under less than optimal circumstances) is not present” - holding that a defendant's mere 3% liability for a patient's injury was sufficient to submit the issue of substantial factor causation to the jury - finding that New Jersey’s Good Samaritan statute does not apply to a hospital physician who renders emergency care to a patient at a hospital - stating that the law did "not provide immunity at all" ## Opinion text VERNIERO, J., dissenting. The Court concludes that the Good Samaritan Act cannot be invoked to immunize a physician who responds in a hospital setting to an emergent call by another physician to assist the latter physician’s patient in crisis. Unlike the majority, I believe that under the statute as written a health-care professional in a hospital who does not otherwise have a duty to act is entitled to the same Good Samaritan protections as any other person. In my view, the proper disposition is to remand this matter to the Law Division to evaluate whether any physician agreements, hospital protocols, or regulations require a broad imposition of a duty in these circumstances. I accept the majority’s impressive historical analysis of Good Samaritan legislation throughout the country. For me, however, that history does not demonstrate convincingly that our Legislature intended the Act to stop at the hospital door. In that respect, I find only two limitations on the reach of the Act, namely, that the aid giving rise to liability must be rendered “at the scene of an accident or emergency” or “while transporting the victim ... to a hospital or other facility!.]” N.J.S.A 2A:62A-1. I would not impose an additional restriction when the Legislature itself has declined to do so. See Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 419 , 730 A.2d 327 (1999) (urging courts not to imply certain terms to statute when excluded by Legislature). I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Act’s “hospital or other facility” language is intended to exclude from the Act’s protections “any” Good Samaritan who has rendered emergency care in that setting. Ante at 258, 798 A.2d at 62. The *265 1987 language regarding the transport of victims from an accident scene “to a hospital or other facility[,]” L. 1987, c. 296, was enacted specifically to ensure that the Act protected “members of volunteer first aid, rescue and ambulance squads.” Assembly Law, Public Safety, Defense and Corrections Committee, Statement [to] Assembly [Bill] No. 2467, reprinted in N.J.S.A 2A:62A-1. The Legislature’s purpose was merely to describe in sufficient detail the category of non-physicians who may be called on to render emergency aid while transporting a victim to a different location. I might agree with the Court’s ultimate disposition following a remand. Absent a remand, however, I would interpret the Act consistent with what I discern as its underlying purpose, namely, to ensure that as many persons as possible respond to a patient’s emergent needs. Stated differently, I would not dismiss the possibility that the Legislature would rather have the hospital physician or registered nurse in a remote location respond unhesitatingly to an emergency elsewhere on the premises, than have those same professionals be slow to act, or not act at all, out of fear of litigation. I do not advocate the wholesale immunization of physicians and other professionals in hospitals. Rather, I would continue to tether the Good Samaritan statute to its original moorings, meaning I would apply its protections unless the person who administered the emergency aid had a pre-existing duty to act. See Praet v. Borough of Sayreville, 218 N.J.Super. 218, 224 , 527 A.2d 486 (App.Div.) (observing that “threshold question in determining the applicability of the Good Samaritan Act is whether the person claiming its immunity had a preexisting duty”), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 681 , 532 A.2d 253 (1987). After a remand, we might well conclude that Dr. Ranzini had such a duty and that she, and indeed most of her medical colleagues, would fall outside the purview of the Act. I am unwilling to reach that conclusion as a matter of law. Nor would I restrict the Act to all emergent situations except those found in a *266 hospital unless the statute explicitly contained that restriction, which it does not. I respectfully dissent. Justice COLEMAN joins in this opinion. For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices STEIN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI — 5. For remandment — Justices COLEMAN and VERNIERO — 2. Opposed — None. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9533329. Public record. Not legal advice.