# Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Products > Hawaii Supreme Court · December 11, 1997 · 86 Haw. 214 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9532865 ## Case - **Full name:** KAWAMATA FARMS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED AGRI PRODUCTS, Loveland Industries, Inc., Dba United Agri Products (Hawaii); Reginald Hasegawa, E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Company, a Delaware Corporation; Terra International, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; Platte Chemical Co., a Nebraska Corporation; Bartlo Packaging, a New Jersey Corporation, Defendants-Appellants; Stanley T. TOMONO and Cynthia T. Tomono Dba S.T.T. Farms, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Counter-Defendants-Counter-Appellees, v. E.I. DuPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation; Terra International, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; Platte Chemical Co., a Nebraska Corporation; Bartlo Packaging, Incorporated, a New Jersey Corporation; Loveland Industries, Inc., Dba in Hawai'i as Loveland Industries, Inc., United Agri Products Hawaii, Reginald Hasegawa, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Defendants-Cross-Appellees, and Kristofer Knutsen; Inger-Lise Knutsen; Bernard H.F. Chun; Marion Bush, Trustee of the Marion Pualani Keliikipi Bush Trust, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Claimants-Cross-Appellants-Counter-Claimants-Counter-Appellants - **Court:** Hawaii Supreme Court - **Decided:** December 11, 1997 - **Citations:** 86 Haw. 214; 948 P.2d 1055; 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1132; 1997 Haw. LEXIS 101 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Ramil - **Judges:** Moon, Klein, Levinson, Nakayama, Ramil - **Cited by:** 163 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9532865 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that "[t]here are sound reasons for the rule. It is unfair to the trial court to reverse on a ground that no one even suggested might be error. It is unfair to the opposing party, who might have met the argument not made below. Finally, it does not comport with the con… - holding that "even when a trial court abuses its discretion in a civil trial by giving the jury an inappropriate remedial instruction, we will nevertheless affirm the jury's verdict when it appears from the record as a whole that it is not reasonably likely that an outcome mor… - holding that circuit court abused its discretion by instructing jury that it could consider discovery misconduct by a pesticide manufacturer in considering the merits of a products liability case, because "the power to sanction for discovery misconduct is within the exclusive … - stating that “[i]f a finding is not properly attacked, it is binding; and any conclusion which follows from it and is a correct statement of law is valid” (quoting Wisdom v. Pflueger, 4 Haw.App. 455, 459, 667 P.2d 844, 848 (1983)) - stating that “if a finding is not properly attacked, it is binding; and any conclusion which follows from it and is a correct statement of law is valid” (quoting W isdom v. Pflueger, 4 Haw.App. 455, 459, 667 P.2d 844, 848 (1983)) ## Opinion text RAMIL, Justice, concurring and dissenting. I concur with the opinion except with respect to part II.F, in which the majority construes HRCP Rule 60(b)(3) to allow affirmative relief and recovery by the Plaintiffs and the Declaratory Defendants of additional attorneys’ fees and costs. While I agree that courts have the “inherent power to curb abuses and promote a fair process, including the power to impose sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees,” Majority, op. at 1098, I do not believe that HRCP Rule 60(b)(3) is the appropriate vehicle by which to do so. Moreover, despite Dupont’s egregious conduct in this case, the Plaintiffs and the Declaratory Defendants simply were not entitled to relief *262 under HRCP Rule 60(b)(3) in the form of amended findings of fact. “[Wjhere the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.” State v. Wells, 78 Hawai'i 373, 376 , 894 P.2d 70, 73 (1995). Here, the plain language of HRCP Rule 60(b)(3) provides that it may only be used to set aside a prior order or judgment: “the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” HRCP Rule 60(b)(3) (emphasis added). A court may not avail itself of HRCP Rule 60(b)(3) to grant affirmative relief. Additionally, this court has always deemed the federal courts’ interpretation of the FRCP as highly persuasive because our own HRCP were patterned after the federal rules, see Shaw v. North American Title Co., 76 Hawai'i 323, 326 , 876 P.2d 1291, 1294 (1994); Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 60-61 , 451 P.2d 814, 824 (1969); Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532 , 445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968). Federal case law interpreting FRCP Rule 60(b), the HRCP Rule 60(b)(3) counterpart, has consistently held that the Rule “is only available to set aside a prior order or judgment; a court may not use Rule 60 to grant affirmative relief in addition to the relief contained in the prior order or judgment.” 12 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.25 (3d ed.1997) (footnote omitted). For example, in Adduono v. World Hockey Ass’n, 824 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir.1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Under [FRCP] Rule 60(b), the district court may grant relief from a final order or judgment for mistake, newly-discovered evidence, fraud, voidness, satisfaction, or other reasons. [FRCP] Rule 60(b) is available, however, only to set aside a prior order or judgment. It cannot be used to impose additional affirmative relief. Adduono, 824 F.2d at 620 (citation omitted). Similarly, in my view, the Plaintiffs and the Declaratory Defendants were not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under HRCP Rule 60(b)(3). Finally, it is highly questionable that the Plaintiffs and the Declaratory Defendants were in a position to obtain any relief under HRCP Rule 60(b)(3), simply because, for all intents and purposes, they were the prevailing” parties. Once again, as the majority opinion notes, federal courts have held that a movant seeking relief under FRCP Rule 60(b) must establish (1) by clear and convincing evidence that the verdict was obtained through some form of misconduct, and (2) that such “ ‘conduct ... prevented the losing party from fully presenting his ease or defense.’” Majority at 1096 (citation omitted, emphasis added). In this case, the Plaintiffs prevailed in their claim, and Dupont’s misbehavior did not adversely affect the Declaratory Defendants’ cross-claim against Dupont, as stated in the circuit court’s finding of fact 97. Therefore, in my view, the circuit court abused its discretion when it granted Plaintiffs’ and Declaratory Defendants’ motion for relief under HRCP Rule 60(b)(3). ■While Dupont’s discovery abuses were indeed deplorable and such actions should be dissuaded, I do not believe that HRCP Rule 60(b)(3) provides the sound legal foundation upon which to do so in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent with the majority opinion in part II.F. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9532865. Public record. Not legal advice.