# People v. Dixon > Appellate Court of Illinois · November 23, 1999 · 308 Ill. App. 3d 1008 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9532766 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAWRENCE C. DIXON, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois - **Decided:** November 23, 1999 - **Citations:** 308 Ill. App. 3d 1008; 242 Ill. Dec. 641; 721 N.E.2d 1172; 1999 Ill. App. LEXIS 812 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Myerscough - **Judges:** Steigmann, Myerscough - **Cited by:** 25 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9532766 ## Opinion text JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: In Atkinson, the Supreme Court of Illinois clearly stated that “[t]he issue before this court is whether the mere-fact method of impeachment should be adopted in Illinois.” Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 455, 713 N.E.2d at 535. The court answered that question by stating “[w]e reject the mere-fact approach, and we affirm the trial court’s admission of defendant’s prior convictions pursuant to the Montgomery rule.” Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 464, 713 N.E.2d at 538. The supreme court went on to explain: “Fotential prejudice to the defendant also supports rejection of the mere-fact approach. Under the mere-fact approach, the jury hears direct proof that the accused has been convicted of a felony, the exact nature of which is excluded from the jury. This bare announcement unavoidably invites jury speculation about the nature of the prior crime. There is a potential danger that the jury would speculate that the defendant was previously convicted of a more serious crime. Consequently, the mere-fact approach may result in unfair prejudice to the defendant arising from jury speculation as to the nature of the prior unnamed crime.” Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 459, 713 N.E.2d at 536-37. Further, in Atkinson, Justice Rathje recognized the majority’s position in his dissent: “I fail to see the basis for the majority’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, it always is improper to use the mere-fact approach to impeach a testifying defendant.” Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 464, 713 N.E.2d at 539 (Rathje, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J.). The majority in this case, however, finds that the use of mere-fact impeachment did not constitute plain error because the evidence was neither closely balanced nor did the error deprive defendant of a fair trial. I disagree. “Had defendant’s case been tried in accordance with Atkinson, the trial court, in its discretion, might well have permitted the jury to learn that defendant’s four prior convictions were for burglary, one of the crimes for which defendant was then standing trial.” 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1018. See also Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 463, 713 N.E.2d at 538 (holding, “similarity [between the current charge and the prior convictions] alone does not mandate exclusion of the prior conviction[s]”). In this instance, the trial court, in fact, used the Montgomery balancing test and found that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of admitting the prior convictions. Since the court did in fact engage in that balancing test and found that it would not admit those prior convictions, the use of the mere-fact approach was error as a matter of law, and the defendant has been denied a fair trial. Defendant suffered clear prejudice here when the trial court allowed the mere-fact use of “several” felonies, as opposed to completely barring the use of the actual convictions. Moreover, the majority, contrary to the record states: “Assuming arguendo that the supreme court intended its decision in Atkinson to have retroactive effect as to cases on appeal at the time it was decided, it would still provide no aid to defendant.” 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1018. However, Atkinson does in fact apply retroactively. Supreme court decisions apply to all pending cases unless it directs otherwise. As stated in a recent fifth district case citing People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67 , 708 N.E.2d 1169 (1999): “The supreme court specifically held in Linder that its decision would be applied retroactively and that, as a general rule, supreme court ‘decisions apply to all cases that are pending when the decision is announced, unless [the supreme court] directs otherwise.’ Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 75 [, 708 N.E.2d at 1173 ]. Here, the case at bar was pending in this court at the time the supreme court rendered its decision in Linder. Therefore, we are compelled to apply the rules set forth therein to the facts of this case.” People v. Bullard, No. 5 — 98—0633, slip op. at 4 (August 13, 1999). The supreme court did not indicate that the Atkinson holding should not be applied retroactively. Moreover, this court has previously recognized this doctrine in People v. Corrie, 294 Ill. App. 3d 496, 505 , 690 N.E.2d 128, 134 (1998), wherein this court stated: “The supreme court’s decisions generally apply to all cases that are pending — including pending on appeal — when the supreme court announces its decisions, unless the supreme court directs otherwise.” I would therefore reverse pursuant to the supreme court’s rejection of the use of the mere-fact method of impeachment with prior convictions. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9532766. Public record. Not legal advice.