# Haas v. South Bend Community School Corporation

> Indiana Supreme Court · November 27, 1972 · 259 Ind. 515

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9532236

## Case

- **Full name:** Johnell Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., Et Al.
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** November 27, 1972
- **Citations:** 259 Ind. 515; 289 N.E.2d 495; 1972 Ind. LEXIS 508
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by DeBruler
- **Judges:** Hunter, Prentice, Debruler, Arterburn, Givan
- **Cited by:** 71 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9532236

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the administration of interscholastic athletics by the IHSAA should be considered "state action" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment

## Opinion text

Opinion Concurring in Result
DeBruler, J.
Full and equal opportunity to participate in the curricular and extra-curricular educational activities of our public schools, with full and equal opportunity to receive the benefits flowing from such participation, is guaranteed to all public school students, be they male or female, by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I agree completely that IHSAA Rule 9, § 7, operates so as to deny Johnell Haas and the class she represents that full and equal opportunity. I likewise agree that the regulation by the IHSAA of interscholastic athletic activities constitutes state action, and must meet the constitutional standards of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that all public high school students of which the class here involved is but a part, have fundamental rights afforded by the Constitution which each may individually and personally seek to protect in the courts of this State. I therefore vote with the majority in reversing the judgment of the trial court.
Unlike the majority, my vote to reverse the trial court judgment here does not rest upon any determination or assumption on my part that this IHSAA rule could be constitutionally applied to prohibit male and female students from participating in sports calling for physical contact. That issue is not before us in this case involving as it does the game of golf. And unlike the majority, I do not decide in this case, as it is not squarely before us, whether the IHSAA rule could be constitutionally applied to prohibit mixed teams in schools which provide a separate but equal interscholastic athletic programs for the male and female segments of their *528 student bodies. Whether such a dual system would deny to male or female athletes, as well as the entire student body, substantial educational benefits which should flow to them front interscholastic athletic competitions is a much broader issue than that presented by this appeal. Anyone who would seek to support the rationality of the separatist principle served by such dual systems would have a difficult burden indeed. The defender of such a system in court, surely could not be successful merely by presenting evidence that the high school track and field records of men are better than those of.women, as was done by appellee in the case before us. No trial court investigation into the relative athletic abilities of men and women could be complete merely upon a demonstration that male track and field champions have historically bettered their female counterparts in the record books. Such evidence cannot support a conclusion that the male sex is athletically superior. An objective observer could not determine which of two opposing armies is superior merely by examining the strongest and bravest soldier in each. For constitutional purposes, such an investigation would necessarily focus on the causes of any differential in the relative performances of male and female athletes.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9532236. Public record. Not legal advice.