# People v. Stout

> Illinois Supreme Court · April 19, 1985 · 106 Ill. 2d 77

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9531863

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROBERT L. STOUT, Appellee
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 19, 1985
- **Citations:** 106 Ill. 2d 77; 87 Ill. Dec. 521; 477 N.E.2d 498; 1985 Ill. LEXIS 205
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Simon
- **Judges:** Clark, Simon
- **Cited by:** 114 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Abrogated by People v. Redmond, 2024 IL 129201 (2024).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9531863

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the odor of burnt cannabis without other corroborating evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle
- holding the odor of cannabis alone was sufficient to establish probable cause

## Opinion text

JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting:
The majority’s holding that the police officer’s uncorroborated detection of the odor of cannabis was sufficient to allow a warrantless search allows police officers who either choose to ignore the Constitution or mistakenly break the law the avenue to abuse the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.
That amendment protects citizens “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” One form of protection against unreasonable intrusions is the warrant which can only be issued upon a finding of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. (See, e.g., United States v. Ross (1982), 456 U.S. 798 , 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 .) Many situations, though, do not permit the time required for preintrusion scrutiny involved in obtaining a warrant. The warrantless search, conducted without this protection, must still meet the probable cause requirement when accompanied by some exigent circumstance which justifies forgoing the warrant. See, e.g., Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752 , 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 , 89 Si Ct. 2034.
The majority’s holding abuses the probable-cause requirement because it does not require any corroboration of the officer’s sense of smell, a completely subjective ground for probable cause. While an officer trained in odor detection may be very accurate, the Constitution requires more. People v. Loe (1973), 16 Ill. App. 3d 291 , cited by the majority (106 Ill. 2d at 84), involved a situation different from the one presented here. In Loe the officer, after smelling marijuana, saw a roach butt in plain view. This corroboration justified the search. Likewise, any other corroboration, including rolling papers, erratic behavior, or any other observation by an officer, would supply a sufficient basis for a warrantless search.
One recent example, cited by the majority (106 Ill. 2d at 86), People v. Smith (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 412 , involved a police officer who stopped the defendant’s truck for a vehicle violation. Meeting the defendant between the squad car and truck, he smelled alcohol on the defendant’s breath. But the officer’s search did not depend only
on what he smelled. He then approached the truck and noticed, in plain view, an open bottle in a brown paper bag and a small wooden box often used to carry cannabis. After observing these objects, he searched the truck. The officer in that case had some tangible confirmation of his subjective observation.
This case, on the other hand, presents the narrow question of a warrantless search based merely on what the officer stated he smelled without any corroborating indications. Because the majority holding depends upon a completely subjective reaction which is virtually impossible to dispute, my judgment is that the majority opinion opens the door too wide to abuse, and I therefore dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9531863. Public record. Not legal advice.