# Department of Corrections Ex Rel. People v. Adams

> Appellate Court of Illinois · April 23, 1996 · 278 Ill. App. 3d 803

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529671

## Case

- **Full name:** The DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Ex Rel. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MATTHEW ADAMS, No. N60078, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** April 23, 1996
- **Citations:** 278 Ill. App. 3d 803; 215 Ill. Dec. 631; 663 N.E.2d 1145
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Green
- **Judges:** Steigmann, Green
- **Cited by:** 18 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529671

## Opinion text

JUSTICE GREEN, dissenting:
I agree with the well-reasoned portions of the majority opinion holding that the legislation in issue meets constitutional muster and that the evidence presented was admissible. Nevertheless two aspects of the legislation are ambiguous. One question is whether the court is (1) to make determination of the portion of the expense incurred in incarcerating the convict which the convict is able to pay and enter judgment accordingly, or (2) to make determination of the cost of keeping the convict and enter judgment in that amount, leaving the determination of what portion of that sum the convict is able to pay to post-judgment proceedings. The other question concerns the burden of proof in regard to ability to pay.
In regard to the first question, the circuit court indicated it thought that the second procedure with a post-judgment determination of ability to pay was intended. I interpret the majority opinion to indicate it deems the first procedure is applicable. I agree with the majority in that respect. Regardless of which procedure applies, I cannot agree that the ambiguity, if any, as to where the burden of proof on ability to pay lies should be resolved by placing the burden on the convict. The ability of the convict to pay seems to be an element the cause of action created. Ordinarily, the plaintiff has the burden of proof as to the elements of a cause of action.
The majority would not apply the usual rule here because the convict would have more information about his finances than the Director. Thus, the majority concludes that the sensible interpretation of the legislation is to put the burden of making a showing as to ability to pay on the convict. Because of my concern that such an interpretation may create unnecessary problems, I do not agree that is a sensible construction of the statute.
A prime goal of corrections is that after a convict completes a sentence of incarceration, that convict will become rehabilitated and become a decent citizen. All of society will benefit if that happens but we know that all too often it does not. The rehabilitative task of a convict upon release is often difficult. Placing a substantial financial burden on a convict at that time is counterproductive and I do not think that the legislation involved here is intended to do so. Rather, it is aimed at the few convicts who have substantial assets.
The Director should not proceed against a convict without an investigation which reveals that the convict has substantial assets. With the information obtained by the investigation and the discovery procedures available, the State will not have an undue burden in making a case. I recognize that here, the defendant had counsel who advised defendant to stay away from the hearing. The State could have countered that by requiring his presence by subpoena. We should not permit a bad case to make bad law.
Many convicts who may be faced with similar proceedings may not be able to obtain counsel and will be ineffective in looking out for their rights or too confused or foolish to properly respond to the suit. Particularly, this is likely to occur if the procedure is to have the ability to pay determined post-judgment. The court can do a better job of protecting from an improper or unfair order if the Department has the burden of showing the convict’s ability to pay.
I recognize that, in any event, a convict who is subject to a money judgment does have the protection of any judgment debtor under state law and federal bankruptcy law. However, for a convict to have a substantial financial burden upon release is a great disincentive to his becoming productive.
The majority resolves the ambiguity on burden of proof on the basis of what it thinks is the most sensible procedure. For the reasons stated, I deem the placing of the burden on the Department is the sensible way to resolve the ambiguity. Although I have no sympathy for the position of the instant defendant, rather than agree to an interpretation I think is unwise, I would reverse the instant judgment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529671. Public record. Not legal advice.