# Lupo v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners > Appellate Court of Illinois · April 21, 1980 · 82 Ill. App. 3d 449 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529509 ## Case - **Full name:** RONALD LUPO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF THE VILLAGE OF GLENDALE HEIGHTS, Defendants-Appellees - **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois - **Decided:** April 21, 1980 - **Citations:** 82 Ill. App. 3d 449; 37 Ill. Dec. 622; 402 N.E.2d 624; 1980 Ill. App. LEXIS 4320 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** On rehearing by Seidenfeld - **Judges:** Seidenfeld - **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529509 ## Opinion text Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD delivered the opinion of the court: We granted a rehearing based on plaintiff’s claim that he has been denied constitutional equal protection. He now argues that a requirement that an officer be given warnings prior to interrogation found in the civil service provisions in division I of article 10 of the Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 10 — 1—18) must be read in pari materia with the provision here applicable to a division II municipality. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 10 — 2.1—17. Plaintiff relies on Palcek v. City of Chicago Heights (1979), Ill. Rev. Stat. 702, published subsequently to his oral argument. Placek noted that the legislature had specifically provided civil service employees, including police officers in division I municipalities, with the safeguards which included, among others, that before he may be interrogated he must be advised in writing that his admissions may be used as the basis for charges seeking his removal or discharge and that he has the right to counsel. ( 74 Ill. App. 3d 702, 704 .) Further noting that there is no similar provision in the statute governing removal or discharge in division II municipalities, the court found no reasonable basis for a different legislative classification. It concluded that although concededly no due process issue was involved, the division I safeguards must be read into the provisions applicable to division II municipalities to avoid a denial of equal protection. ( 74 Ill. App. 3d 702, 706 .) Palcek was decided purportedly on the basis of Kropel v. Conlisk (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 17 . However, we do not believe that Kropel mandates the result reached in Palcek. The equal protection analysis employed in Kropel is very different from that to be followed in the situation faced in Palcek and the case at bar. In Kropel, an independent constitutional right, due process, of a particular class was violated. The equal protection language was essentially cumulative or an alternative ground for decision. Kropel does not stand for the proposition that everything in section 10 — 2.1—17 must be read into section 10 — 1—18 and 10 — 1—18.1, and vice versa. Here, neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved. Classifications related to population are not inherently suspect. (People v. Palkes (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 472, 77 ; People v. Clark (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 381, 393-94 .) Thus the classification under attack must be upheld if there is a rational relationship between the statutory classification and the purposes of the legislation. The purpose need not be implicit in the legislation or found to have been in the mind of the legislators, for “any hypothetical purpose will support the classification." People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 842, 848 . The purpose of the legislature in establishing different procedural protections for police officers in various classes of municipalities within a population range may have been to provide safeguards consistent with administrative resources and organizational ability. Municipalities do not fall within division I or division II solely on account of their population, since those with a population between 5,000 and 250,000 may choose which division they will come under. Cities can thus make an informed decision as to which procedures and administrative structures are best suited to their needs, abilities, and resources. In comparing division I and division II, there is then a plausible connection between the procedural protections provided and the ability of the various municipalities to provide them. Smaller municipalities with fewer resources and less administrative apparatus are more likely to adopt division II procedures, as did Glendale Heights in the instant case. Thus the legislature made a rational choice in giving more procedural protection to officers of municipalities which are better equipped to handle investigations. Even if the failure of the legislature to give written notice and warning to officers in division II municipalities was hot by design, equal protection is not automatically violated. “[A] legislature need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.” McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners (1969), 394 U.S. 802, 809 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 739, 746 , 89 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 . The warning provision applicable to division I municipalities is part of a scheme which gives officers under civil service certain rights in the disciplinary proceedings. The legislature is free to make reforms one step at a time. (Friedman & Rochester, Ltd. v. Walsh (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 413, 421-22 .) We cannot find that the classification made is wholly without any rational basis; therefore, we do not choose to follow the holding in Palcek. The judgment is therefore affirmed. Affirmed. WOODWARD and NASH, JJ., concur. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529509. Public record. Not legal advice.