# People v. Hope > Illinois Supreme Court · October 29, 1998 · 184 Ill. 2d 39 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529494 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. EDGAR HOPE, Appellant - **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court - **Decided:** October 29, 1998 - **Citations:** 184 Ill. 2d 39; 234 Ill. Dec. 379; 702 N.E.2d 1282; 1998 Ill. LEXIS 1574 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Miller - **Judges:** Harrison, Miller, Bilandic - **Cited by:** 35 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529494 ## Opinion text JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the State may not, on remand, present victim impact evidence regarding crimes other than one for which this capital defendant is now being sentenced. Victim impact evidence relating to other crimes committed by a defendant can be relevant and reliable, and, just like evidence of the circumstances of the defendant’s other crimes, it should be admissible in aggravation here. The majority relies on two main grounds in support of its decision to exclude victim impact evidence concerning the defendant’s other crimes. First, the majority believes that the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/1 through 9 (West 1994)) limits the range of admissible evidence to information relating to an offense on which the defendant is then being sentenced. 184 Ill. 2d at 49 (“However, the statute does not contemplate, and we will not condone, an expansion of victim impact statements to include evidence from victims other than the victims of the offense on trial”). In support of this holding the majority quotes section 6(a) of the Act, which provides: “In any case where a defendant has been convicted of a violent crime *** and a victim of the violent crime is present in the courtroom at the time of the sentencing ***, the victim upon his or her request shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant’s criminal conduct *** has had upon the victim.” 725 ILCS 120/6(a) (West 1994). From this provision the majority infers that victim impact evidence, to be admissible, must relate to the particular crime or crimes on which the defendant is being sentenced. The inference is flawed, however, for the majority seriously misapprehends the scope and purpose of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act. Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, the Act is not intended to alter or restrict the range of evidence that the State may introduce in aggravation; instead, the Act is designed to provide and enforce certain statutory and constitutional rights for victims and witnesses of violent crimes. 725 ILCS 120/2 (West 1994). The ability of the prosecution to present evidence in aggravation, whether in capital cases (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(e) (West 1994)) or in noncapital cases (730 ILCS 5/5 — 4—1(a)(4) (West 1994)), remains distinct from the rights of victims and witnesses of violent crimes to have a role in sentencing hearings, as provided by the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act. See People v. Willis, 184 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1045-46 (1989); People v. Keyes, 175 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1017 (1988); People v. Estrella, 170 Ill. App. 3d 292, 295-96 (1988). More specifically, section 6 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, cited by the majority, applies when the victim, on his or her own initiative, wishes to address the sentencing court; section 6 does not purport to limit the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise introduce in aggravation. People v. Pavlovskis, 229 Ill. App. 3d 776, 782 (1992). The appellate court explained this distinction in People v. Wallace, 170 Ill. App. 3d 329 (1988). Rejecting a defendant’s argument that a victim impact statement was improperly introduced into evidence because it was not presented through the testimony of the victim of the offense, the Wallace court stated: “Under defendant’s interpretation, the legislature thus would have intended by adoption of the [Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act] to make it more difficult for a victim’s statement to be considered than was already possible. *** Clearly, the legislature did not intend to make sentencing more burdensome on those who have already suffered the traumatic effects of violent crime. In keeping with the name and purpose of the statute, we conclude that section 6 of the [Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act] merely sets forth the absolute right of a victim to present an oral impact statement at sentencing if she so desires. It does not impose a new requirement that a victim be present before a sentencing court can consider the impact on her as presented in the form of a written statement.” Wallace, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 334 . Eluding the majority is the important distinction between the rights enforced by the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act and the. prosecution’s separate authority to introduce evidence in aggravation. The majority’s interpretation turns the statute on its head and threatens to severely limit the prosecution’s ability to present relevant, reliable evidence in aggravation: the majority transforms what was designed to provide a benefit to victims and witnesses into a shield for their offenders. The ironic and unfortunate result of today’s decision, with its crabbed interpretation of the Act, is “to make sentencing more burdensome on those who have already suffered the traumatic effects of violent crime,” an outcome the legislature could not have intended. I would also note that the majority’s reliance on section 6 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses-Act raises a potential conflict with a companion provision, section 9 of the Act. Section 9 provides, in pertinent part, “Nothing in this Act shall create a basis for vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.” 725 ILCS 120/9 (West 1994). I recognize that the majority bases its vacatur of the defendant’s death sentence on an unrelated ground, the failure of the trial judge to question prospective jurors about racial bias. To the extent that the majority would also find reversible error under the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, however, that result would seemingly run contrary to the limitation expressed in section 9 of the Act. As additional support for today’s decision, the majority refers to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 , 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). In that case, however, the Court did not address the question raised in this appeal; language from Payne cited by the majority in support of the present holding simply reflects the matters at issue in that case, and not the Court’s views on whether victim impact evidence relating to other offenses may also be introduced. I do not believe that Payne forecloses introduction of the evidence challenged here. Just as evidence of the circumstances of a defendant’s other offenses is admissible in aggravation, so too should be victim impact testimony from the victims of those other crimes. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529494. Public record. Not legal advice.