# McMahan v. Industrial Commission

> Illinois Supreme Court · October 22, 1998 · 183 Ill. 2d 499

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529311

## Case

- **Full name:** ROBERT McMAHAN, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Et Al. (Farmer’s Elevator, Appellant)
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 22, 1998
- **Citations:** 183 Ill. 2d 499; 234 Ill. Dec. 205; 702 N.E.2d 545; 1998 Ill. LEXIS 1572
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Miller
- **Judges:** Harrison, Heiple, Miller
- **Cited by:** 96 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529311

## Opinion text

JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I do not agree with the part of the majority opinion that overrules Childress v. Industrial Comm’n, 93 Ill. 2d 144 (1982), or with the majority’s interpretation of section 16 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. In my view, we should continue to follow Childress until the legislature changes the statutory language on which that opinion is based.
In overruling Childress, the majority relies primarily on the last antecedent rule, a maxim invoked by the dissenting justice in Childress. Childress, 93 Ill. 2d at 152-53 (Simon, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). That rule of statutory construction is overcome here, however, by another well-established rule: the principle that legislative acquiescence in a judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the statute itself and should not be lightly altered by later cases. In Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 (1997), Justice Harrison, writing in dissent, explained the operation of this principle:
“The legislature is presumed to know the construction the courts have placed upon a statute. When it amends a statute but does not alter a previous interpretation by this court, we assume that the legislature intended for the amendment to have the same interpretation previously given. Williams v. Crickman, 81 Ill. 2d 105, 111 (1980). Moreover, where the legislature has acquiesced in a judicial construction of the law over a substantial period of time, as it did here, the court’s construction becomes part of the fabric of the law, and a departure from that construction by the court would be tantamount to an amendment of the statute itself. Charles v. Siegfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482, 492 (1995). The power to make such amendments does not lie in the courts. Independent Voters v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 117 Ill. 2d 90, 100 (1987).”
These same considerations compel our continued adherence to Childress and its interpretation of section 16. Like Justice Harrison in Berlin, I believe that in this case “a departure from that construction by the court would be tantamount to an amendment of the statute itself.” The legislature has amended this provision of the Act three times since Childress was decided 16 years ago, in 1982, yet the legislature has chosen not to alter the language this court interpreted in its earlier decision. By now, that interpretation has become part of the “fabric of the law.” For these reasons, I would not overrule Childress. Any amendments to the statute at this late date should be made by the legislature and not by this court.
Finally, I would note that, unlike Childress, Brinkmann v. Industrial Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 462 (1980), was limited by this court soon after it was decided, and the legislature has not altered that limited interpretation.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9529311. Public record. Not legal advice.