# Yakima First Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Gray > Washington Supreme Court · May 24, 1973 · 82 Wash. 2d 295 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9528885 ## Case - **Full name:** Yakima First Baptist Homes, Inc., Respondent, v. Dale A. Gray Et Al., Appellants - **Court:** Washington Supreme Court - **Decided:** May 24, 1973 - **Citations:** 82 Wash. 2d 295; 510 P.2d 243; 1973 Wash. LEXIS 684 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Finley - **Judges:** Wright, Finley - **Cited by:** 25 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9528885 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that where rent subsidies were paid pursuant to contract they could not be considered "public donations” under Washington’s charitable tax exemption statute requiring that exempt organizations be "supported in whole or in part by public donations” - holding that "care for the aged ... cannot be said [to be] a religious purpose within the commonly accepted definitions of the word `religious'" ## Opinion text Finley, J. (dissenting) — Because the record in this case supports the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that the respondent’s home for the aged and infirm qualifies for property tax exemption under RCW 84.36.040, I am compelled to dissent. The pertinent portions of RCW 84.36.040, as set out in the majority opinion, establish a fourfold test for property tax exemption: [ 1. Nature and Purpose of the Property ] All free public libraries, orphanages, orphan asylums, institutions for the reformation of fallen women, homes for the aged and infirm, and hospitals for the care of the sick, [ 2. Funding ] when such institutions are supported in whole or in part by public donations or private charity, [ 3 .Use of Funds ] and all of the income and profits thereof are devoted, after paying the expenses thereof, to the purposes of such institutions; [ 4. Exclusive Use of Property ] and the grounds, together with all real and personal property owned or used as a part of such institutions, whenever such libraries, orphanages, institutions, homes, 'and hospitals are built and used exclusively for the purposes herein enumerated. RCW 84.36.040. Regarding the first requirement concerning the nature and purpose of the property, the trial court’s findings support the contention that the property under consideration qualifies as a home “for the aged and infirm” (RCW 84.36.040): 15. The popular name for plaintiff’s facility is-The Sun *303 Tower. To be accepted as a resident of Sun Tower an applicant must at the time of initial acceptance be ambulatory and at least 62 years of age unless physically handicapped. If married at least one spouse must be 62 years of age. There are no restrictions on race or religion.. The average age of the tenants is 78.8 years. Finding of fact No. 15. This finding is supported by the trial testimony of Marion Bunnell, president and chairman of the board of Yakima First Baptist Homes, Inc., as well as by Mr. Bunnell’s answer to interrogatories to plaintiff No. 14, made a part of the trial record. In addition, the trial court found: 9. The plaintiff came into being as an outgrowth of the religious concern of the congregation of the Yakima First Baptist Church for the needs of the elderly poor of Yakima, and was organized and incorporated by certain members of said church for the following purposes and objectives as set forth in its Amended Articles of Incorporation to-wit: “a) To provide for elderly families and elderly persons on a non-profit basis rental housing and related facilities and services specially designed to meet the physical, social and psychological needs of the aged, and contribute to their health, security, happiness and usefulness in longer living, b) To plan, construct, operate, maintain and improve rental housing and related facilities and services for elderly families and elderly persons. Finding of fact No. 9. From the foregoing, it is evident that the nature and purpose of the property under consideration is to provide a home for the aged and infirm, therefore meeting the first statutory requirement of RCW 84.36.040. 1 *304 The second requirement of the statute, concerning funding, appears to pose the greatest difficulty for the majority opinion. In this area the trial court found the following: 12. In order to commence operations of the facility the following financing was required and obtained from the sources indicated: a. . . . b. Furnishings and equipment in common areas: $8,300.00 obtained by a gift from the Baptist Church aforesaid and in excess of $6,422.00 in miscellaneous gifts or donations of cash or furnishings from such sources as the Bank Clearing House, Pacific Power and Light Company and a wide variety of private individuals. 13. The annual operating costs of plaintiff are derived from the following sources: a. . . . b. Federal Rent Subsidies paid directly by the Federal Government to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has a separate contract with the Federal Government pursuant to which plaintiff is required to devote a certain number of its units to very low income aged persons and for which plaintiff receives a direct rent subsidy payment from the Government. Twenty per cent of plaintiff’s units presently are devoted to persons in this extremely restricted income bracket. ■ c. Miscellaneous donations, frequently of the free use of equipment without which many of the plaintiff’s programs could not be carried out. Findings of fact Nos. 12 and 13. According to Mr. Bunnell, the federal rent subsidy amounts to about $23,000 per year, and, in addition to the donations of the above-listed sources, 100 special pledges of funds have been donated by individual members of the public since 1966. The majority opinion dismisses the federal rent subsidy monies as being “under a ‘contract’ ”, and “therefore, not a ‘public donation’ as that term is used in the statute.” Such reasoning seems *305 to me more ingenuous than ingenious and not very convincing. Furthermore, the issue was not raised by appellant. Notwithstanding this procedural complication, however, it is evident that the intent of the federal government in giving these subsidy monies, no matter how it is done, is no different than that of the individual members of the public whose donations were somewhat less in amount: That is, to financially assist in the maintenance and operation of a home that provides food and shelter for elderly and infirm persons of limited income. Clearly, both the rent subsidy and the other gifts from individual businesses and members of the public constitute “public donations”. The only real objection of the majority to the trial court’s finding of “public donation” is that the “amounts received from contributions appear from the finding to be extremely small.” Upon this basis of comparative size, the majority urges that these public contributions be disregarded and nullified to avoid the perpetration of “fraud upon the public.” Drawing a line such as this, upon the basis of comparative size of donation and actual operative cost, in my judgment, is arbitrary and unsupportable. The statute requires support in part by public donations; it does not establish a quota for public donations at 50 percent, 35 percent, or even 10 percent of actual operating costs. Under the facts of the instant case, it is evident that these honest and well-meant gifts of the public are not token elements in some elaborate scheme of the corporation to perpetrate a fraud upon the public by erecting an unfair tax shelter. Where the donations of the public, including nonmonetary gifts from members of the community, are made with the good faith intent of assisting in the maintenance of housing and programs for the elderly and infirm, it seems a non sequitur at best to conclude without any supportive basis in fact — as does the majority — that such donations are part of a fraudulent scheme. With this in mind, it is evident that this home for the aged and infirm under consideration is “supported in whole or in part by public donations.” RCW 84.36.040. *306 The third portion of the statute requires that all income and profits be devoted to the purposes of the institution. This fact was found by the trial court, and is supported by the trial testimony of Marion Bunnell who stated that the organization is making no profit. Mr. Elmer Rongren, treasurer of the corporation, testified that all income received is spent exclusively on the maintenance and repair of the facility and on the repayment of loans for its construction. The trial court was therefore correct in' concluding that all of the income and profits of Sun Tower are devoted, after paying the expenses thereof, to the purposes of the institution. Indeed, the majority and dissenting opinions are in explicit agreement on this point. The last section of RCW 84.36.040 pertinent to this discussion requires that all property to be exempted be “built and used exclusively” for the purposes of the institution. This the trial court found concerning the “grounds, building and all real and personal property” of the Sun Tower facility (finding of fact No. 22). The entire trial record is replete with evidence that the apartment units, dining area, meeting hall, and all other areas of the facility are used solely for the purpose of offering programs and housing for the elderly and infirm. Because the trial court found that the Sun Tower facility qualified for tax exemption under each criterion of RCW 84.36.040, and because each relevant finding of the trial court is supported by the record, including testimony and documents, the property tax exemption under consideration was, in my best judgment, properly granted under RCW 84.36.040. 2 *307 Upon the basis of the preceding reasoning, I would affirm that portion of the trial court’s ruling awarding the exemption under RCW 84.36.040. Hunter and Utter, JJ., concur with Finley, J. Petition for rehearing denied August 8, 1973. Concerning the statutory phrase, “aged and infirm”, the amicus curiae, Pierce County, argues that this means that all persons in such a home must be both elderly and infirm in order for the facility to qualify for property tax exemption. It is evident, however, that if the legislature had intended to require that each resident of such a facility meet both criteria, it could well have so phrased this strict requirement in a manner such as “homes for persons both aged and infirm”. It is clear that such a requirement would be extremely restrictive, and would effectively prevent the operation of many homes for the elderly.' Where a commonsense construction of the statute is at hand, it is not *304 the function of this court to reach an extreme and unrealistic conclusion in statutory interpretation. It is evident that the state is as concerned with promoting homes for the aged as it is for the infirm. In the instant case, one-third of the residents at Sun Tower are infirm; all are aged. An interesting issue which may have induced a contrary conclusion of law concerns whether the application of RCW 84.36.040 to the Sun Tower facility violates the First Amendment establishment of religion clause, under the immediate circumstances of de facto ownership and operation by what appears to be a sectarian organization. However, this issue was not raised on appeal and therefore is not before the court. Similarly, because the application of RCW 84.36.030 (property tax exemption for property owned by nonsectarian religious organizations) to the immediate request for exemption may pose constitutional ques *307 tions concerning the establishment of religion, no attempt has been made in this dissent to defend the trial court’s conclusion that Sim Tower qualifies for exemption under this statute. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9528885. Public record. Not legal advice.