# State v. Guloy

> Washington Supreme Court · September 5, 1985 · 104 Wash. 2d 412

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9528765

## Case

- **Full name:** The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Pompeyo Benito Guloy, Jr., Et Al, Appellants
- **Court:** Washington Supreme Court
- **Decided:** September 5, 1985
- **Citations:** 104 Wash. 2d 412; 705 P.2d 1182
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Goodloe
- **Judges:** Dore, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Utter, Andersen, Callow, Durham, Pearson, Brach-Tenbach
- **Cited by:** 664 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9528765

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying the "'overwhelming untainted evidence' test" in which an appellate court "determine[s] if the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt"
- stating that it is well established that a constitutional error may be so insignificant as to be harmless
- noting that a party may only assign error in the appellate court on the specific ground of the evidentiary objection made at trial

## Opinion text

*433 Goodloe, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I agree with all of the majority opinion, except that section addressing the defendants' right to a speedy trial. I would hold the defendants were denied a speedy trial under CrR 3.3.
CrR 3.3(i) provides:
(i) Dismissal With Prejudice. A criminal charge not brought to trial within the time period provided by this rule shall be dismissed with prejudice.
The time period provided in the rule for defendants, in the position of Ramil and Guloy, who are not released from jail pending trial, is not later than 60 days after the date of arraignment. CrR 3.3(c)(1). As directed in CrR 3.3(a), " [i]t shall be the responsibility of the court to ensure a trial in accordance with this rule to each person charged with having committed a crime."
I agree with the majority that the 60-day period started on June 10, 1981. Majority opinion, at 428. However, even using this date, the defendants were not brought to trial within 60 days. The trial court was not faced with a dilemma. On July 30, defendant Guloy sought a 5-day continuance. Had the requested 5-day continuance been granted, both defendants would have been brought to trial within the applicable 60-day speedy trial rule. Nothing in the record explains why a request for a 5-day continuance became an order for an 11-day continuance. The fact that it did violates the speedy trial rule.
I dissent from this section.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9528765. Public record. Not legal advice.