# People v. Stevens > California Supreme Court · December 31, 1935 · 5 Cal. 2d 92 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9528417 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CHARLES P. STEVENS, Appellant - **Court:** California Supreme Court - **Decided:** December 31, 1935 - **Citations:** 5 Cal. 2d 92; 53 P.2d 133; 1935 Cal. LEXIS 627 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Langdon - **Judges:** Langdon - **Cited by:** 24 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9528417 ## Opinion text LANGDON, J., Dissenting. I dissent. . Although there is evidence in the record, as stated in the majority opinion, sufficient to sustain the conviction, that evi *101 dence is of such a nature that it does not warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The murder of which appellant stands convicted was committed in 1921. At that time the police investigated appellant because he had admittedly been with the deceased early on the night of the murder. The story appellant told to the police at that time was carefully checked by the police, and various witnesses, not now available, who saw appellant that night, were interrogated. The stories told by these witnesses tallied with that told by appellant and he was exonerated. The only witness who testified to facts connecting appellant with the crime was Addie ¡Minser. By her own testimony, she admits that she was very intoxicated at the time she was supposed to have observed the facts to which she testified. She is supposed to have first told the story about the killing to her then husband some five years after the occurrence of the events. Neither she nor Mr. Minser repeated the story until 1930. At that time, Minser had a fight with his wife, separated from her, and carried the tale to the police. Mrs. Minser was arrested and, after a few days in jail, recounted the tale implicating appellant and one Stickel. These two men were jointly indicted. Stickel was tried first and acquitted. It is quite significant that even if Mrs. Minser’s story of the automobile ride be believed, that story makes Stickel the killer, not appellant. Although Mrs. Minser testified that she was sitting in the automobile directly behind appellant, who was driving, she testified that she did not see Stevens fire the shot, nor did she see a gun in his possession. She saw no flash, nor did she smell powder. If her story is true, Stickel must have been the murderer, not Stevens, but Stickel has been acquitted. If her story is true, the back seat and running board of the automobile must have been so saturated with blood that the cursory cleaning testified to by her could not possibly have removed the traces of the murder, yet the police examined the car the very next morning and found nothing suspicious. It is solely upon the testimony of this woman, who was admittedly “very drunk” at the time; who subsequently became very angry at Stevens because he would not marry her; and who did not tell the story to any one for five years, that this conviction is based. There is no other substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, implicating appellant. No motive *102 was shown. No premeditation was shown. No concert of action between Stickel and appellant was shown. All the witnesses, including Mrs. Minser, concede that Stevens was not drunk. No prior argument or disagreement of any proportions between the decedent and appellant or Stickel was shown. While it must be conceded that Mrs. Minser’s story supports the conviction and that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, the story told by Mrs. Minser is so fantastic as to tax my credulity. Under such circumstances, any errors in the course of the trial warrant a reversal. The record in this case indicates that appellant was represented at the trial by an attorney (not appellant’s present counsel), whose presentation of appellant’s defense was wholly inadequate. After Mrs. Minser had been called by the People as the prosecution’s chief witness and had been cross-examined by appellant’s attorney, and after the prosecution bad closed its ease, appellant’s then attorney called Mrs. Minser as his own witness, thus vouching for her, and had her repeat the entire story of that fatal ride. Counsel offered evidence of appellant’s reputation for peace and quiet and for veracity. The prosecuting attorney did not object to any of this evidence and, although the trial judge, on the motion for a new trial, conceded that much of this testimony was inadmissible, he permitted it to come in because no objection was made. The prosecuting attorney was then permitted to introduce considerable evidence to rebut this inadmissible evidence. Over objection, newspaper articles concerning appellant, and highly damaging to him, were read to the jury, and the prosecuting officer was permitted to produce and read an affidavit filed with the police concerning appellant and charging him with brutality, robbery and other offenses, without any proof of the truth of such charges. On the motion for a new trial, new counsel having been substituted, the trial judge conceded that appellant was not properly represented and stated that he was not entirely satisfied with the case. He further stated that, in the event of an affirmance, “I will then immediately go to the Governor personally, and I will lay all these facts before the Governor, and ask him to commute it from death to life imprisonment.” Under the circumstances of this case, it would seem that a new trial should have been granted, or the trial judge should *103 have exercised the power conferred upon him by section 1181 of the Penal Code and modified the judgment. Waste, C. J., concurred. Rehearing denied. Waste, C. J., and Langdon, J., voted for a rehearing. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9528417. Public record. Not legal advice.