# Sturrup v. Mahan

> Indiana Supreme Court · January 21, 1974 · 261 Ind. 463

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9527260

## Case

- **Full name:** Warren B. Sturrup, by His Guardian and Next Friend, Lamount H. Sturrup v. Robert M. Mahan, Principal of University Junior-Senior High School, Phil N. Eskew, Commissioner of the Indiana High School Athletic Association
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** January 21, 1974
- **Citations:** 261 Ind. 463; 305 N.E.2d 877; 1974 Ind. LEXIS 354
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Arterburn
- **Judges:** Hunter, Debruler, Given, Prentice, Arterburn
- **Cited by:** 37 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg Ex Rel. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222 (1997).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9527260

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding IH-SAA rules on eligibility for transfer students reasonable, but unconstitutional because "said bylaws ... sweep too broadly in their proscription and, hence, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment"
- finding a student who moved from his parent’s Florida home to live with his adult brother in Indiana and was appointed his legal guardian had an in loco parentis relationship

## Opinion text

Dissenting Opinion
Arterburn, C.J.
There is always a temptation for a court to think that it knows better what is good for party litigants than the administrative body or legislature which fixes rules of conduct. As I said in a previous opinion involving the same type of question as here,
“We are judges, not school board members or athletic officials. We should avoid substituting our judgment for that of officials and parties possessing special knowledge of school conditions. We, as judges, should not sit on the school board.”
Hass v. South Bend Community School Corp. (1972), 259 Ind. 515, at 530 , 289 N. E. 2d 495, at 502 (dissenting).
*471 That is exactly what I think is happening here. Too many courts and judges feel that they know how to run other people’s business better than they do. I frankly admit my ignorance as to how high school athletics should be operated and the problems involved therein. As long as a rule, law or regulation appears to make a reasonable classification to obtain a lawful objective or result it should not be struck down. Here the objective of the rule that does not permit a student to jump from one school to the other and participant in competitive athletics without his parents moving with him is meritorious and appears to me to be reasonable and does not involve a “suspect classification.” This, latter term is nothing more than a method used to put the burden of proof on another party. To me the “suspect classification” occurs when a student moves to another school to participate in competitive athletics without his parents moving with him. That is exactly the situation here. The evidence shows without dispute that the student’s brother wrote a letter in which he said:
“. . . If they would have told me this rule before he (Plaintiff) started school I could have sent him home where he could have played with any difficulties what so ever. I could have send money home every month to help my parent out.” (sic)
This evidence shows that the controlling factor in his move was participation in athletics where he went to school. For the reasons stated, I would affirm the trial court. The facts support it.
Note. — Reported in 305 N. E. 2d 877 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9527260. Public record. Not legal advice.