# Farmer v. Brennan > Supreme Court of the United States · June 6, 1994 · 511 U.S. 825 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9527065 ## Case - **Full name:** FARMER v. BRENNAN, WARDEN, Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 6, 1994 - **Citations:** 511 U.S. 825; 114 S. Ct. 1970; 128 L. Ed. 2d 811; 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4274 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stevens - **Judges:** Souter, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Thomas - **Cited by:** 28,944 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9527065 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that “prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment[,]” and, thus, “[p]rison officials charged with deliberate indifference might show, for example, that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficientl… - holding that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment (or the Fourteenth Amendment in the case of pretrial detainees) only when two requirements are met: (I) the alleged deprivation must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious,” resulting “in the denial of ‘the minimal c… - explaining that “[p]rison officials charged with deliberate indifference” may escape liability by “show[ing], for example, that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they… - holding that “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for 15 denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards 16 an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts fro… - holding that “acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm . . . is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk”; adopting criminal-law recklessness standard, which “generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a … ## Opinion text Justice Stevens, concurring. While I continue to believe that a state official may inflict cruel and unusual punishment without any improper subjective motivation, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 116-117 (1976) (dissenting opinion); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S. 294, 306-307 (1991) (White, J., concurring in judgment), I join Justice Souter’s thoughtful opinion because it is faithful to our precedents. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment. Prisons are necessarily dangerous places; they house society’s most antisocial and violent people in close proximity with one another. Regrettably, “[s]ome level of brutality and sexual aggression among [prisoners] is inevitable no *859 matter what the guards do ... unless all prisoners are locked in their cells 24 hours a day and sedated.” McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F. 2d 344, 348 (CA7 1991). Today, in an attempt to rectify such unfortunate conditions, the Court further refines the “National Code of Prison Regulation,” otherwise known as the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I adhere to my belief, expressed in Hudson and Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting), that “judges or juries — but not jailers — impose ‘punishment.’” Id., at 40 . “[PJunishment,” from the time of the Founding through the present day, “has always meant a ‘fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or offense committed by him.’” Id., at 38 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1234 (6th ed. 1990)). See also 2 T. Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the English Language (1780) (defining “punishment” as “[a]ny infliction imposed in vengeance of a crime”). Conditions of confinement are not punishment in any recognized sense of the term, unless imposed as part of a sentence. See Helling, supra, at 42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As an original matter, therefore, this case would be an easy one for me: Because the unfortunate attack that befell petitioner was not part of his sentence, it did not constitute “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. When approaching this case, however, we do not write on a clean slate. Beginning with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976), the Court’s prison condition jurisprudence has been guided, not by the text of the Constitution, but rather by “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id., at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also ante, at 833-834; Helling, supra; Hudson, supra. I continue to doubt the legitimacy of that mode of constitutional decisionmaking, the logical result of which, *860 in this context, is to transform federal judges into superintendents of prison conditions nationwide. See Helling, supra, at 40-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although Estelle loosed the Eighth Amendment from its historical moorings, the Court is now unwilling to accept the full consequences of its decision and therefore resorts to the “subjective” (state of mind) component of post-Estelle Eighth Amendment analysis in an attempt to contain what might otherwise be unbounded liability for prison officials under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Cf. McGill, supra, at 348 . Although I disagree with the constitutional predicate of the Court’s analysis, I share the Court’s view that petitioner’s theory of liability — that a prison official can be held liable for risks to prisoner safety of which he was ignorant but should have known — fails under even “a straightforward application of Estelle.” Helling, supra, at 42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In adopting the “deliberate indifference” standard for challenges to prison conditions, Estelle held that mere “inadvertence] ” or “negligente] ” does not violate the Eighth Amendment. 429 U. S., at 105-106 . “From the outset, thus, we specified that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to every deprivation, or even every unnecessary deprivation, suffered by a prisoner, but only that narrow class of deprivations involving ‘serious’ injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind.” Hudson, supra, at 20 (Thomas, J., dissenting). We reiterated this understanding in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S. 294, 305 (1991), holding that “mere negligence” does not constitute deliberate indifference under Estelle . See also, e. g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 319 (1986). Petitioner’s suggested “should have known” standard is nothing but a negligence standard, as the Court’s discussion implicitly assumes. Ante, at 837-839. Thus, even under Estelle , petitioner’s theory of liability necessarily fails. The question remains, however, what state of mind is sufficient to constitute deliberate indifference under Estelle . *861 Given my serious doubts concerning the correctness of Estelle in extending the Eighth Amendment to cover challenges to conditions of confinement, I believe the scope of the Estelle “right” should be confined as narrowly as possible. Cf. Helling, swpra, at 42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Wilson , the Court has already held that the highest subjective standard known to our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence— “maliciou[s] and sadisti[c]” action “for the very purpose of causing harm,” Whitley, supra, at 320-321 (internal quotation marks omitted) — “does not apply to prison conditions cases.” Wilson, supra, at 303 . The Court today adopts the next highest level of subjective intent, actual knowledge of the type sufficient to constitute recklessness in the criminal law, ante, at 837, 839-840, noting that “due regard” is appropriate “for prison officials’ ‘unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions.’” 1 Ante, at 845 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F. 2d 189,193 (CA9 1979) (Kennedy, J.)). Even though the Court takes a step in the right direction by adopting a restrictive definition of deliberate indifference, I cannot join the Court’s opinion. For the reasons expressed more fully in my dissenting opinions in Hudson and Helling , I remain unwilling to subscribe to the view, adopted by ipse dixit in Estelle , that the Eighth Amendment regulates prison conditions not imposed as part of a sentence. Indeed, “[w]ere the issue squarely presented, ... I might vote to overrule Estelle” Helling, 509 U. S., at 42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the issue is not squarely presented *862 in this case. Respondents have not asked us to revisit Estelle , and no one has briefed or argued the question. In addition to these prudential concerns, stare decisis counsels hesitation in overruling dubious precedents. See 509 U. S., at 42 . For these reasons, I concur in the Court’s judgment. 2 In doing so, however, I remain hopeful that in a proper case the Court will reconsider Estelle in light of the constitutional text and history. The facts of this case demonstrate how difficult that task can be. When petitioner was taken out of general prison population for security reasons at United States Penitentiary-Lewisburg, he asserted that he “d[id] not need extra security precautions” and filed suit alleging that placing him in solitary confinement was unconstitutional. See Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (MD Pa. 1988). Petitioner’s present claim, oddly enough, is essentially that leaving him in general prison population was unconstitutional because it subjected him to a risk of sexual assault. I do not read the remand portion of the Court's opinion to intimate that the courts below reached the wrong result, especially because the Seventh Circuit has long followed the rule of law the Court lays down today. See McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F. 2d 344 (CA7 1991); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F. 2d 645 (CA7 1985). Rather, I regard it as a cautionary measure undertaken merely to give the Court of Appeals an opportunity to decide in the first instance whether the District Court erroneously gave dispositive weight to petitioner’s failure to complain to prison officials that • he believed himself at risk of sexual assault in the general prison population. Ante, at 849. If, on remand, the Seventh Circuit concludes that the District Court did not, nothing in the Court’s opinion precludes the Seventh Circuit from summarily affirming the entry of summary judgment in respondents’ favor. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9527065. Public record. Not legal advice.