# Board of Education of School District No. 68 v. Surety Developers, Inc. > Illinois Supreme Court · November 25, 1975 · 63 Ill. 2d 193 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9526691 ## Case - **Full name:** BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 68, DU PAGE COUNTY, Appellee, v. SURETY DEVELOPERS, INC., Appellant - **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court - **Decided:** November 25, 1975 - **Citations:** 63 Ill. 2d 193; 347 N.E.2d 149; 1975 Ill. LEXIS 344 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Schaefer - **Judges:** Underwood, Schaefer, Crebs - **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9526691 ## Opinion text MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER, dissenting: By this decision the court has conferred upon county boards the power to impose requirements of cash payments as conditions for the granting of permits for special uses. No such authority has ever been granted by any statute, either to counties or municipalities, and all of the previous decisions of this court have denied that such an authority exists. In the last of those decisions, Duggan v. County of Cook (1975), 60 Ill.2d 107, 117 , the court said: “*** We also concur that there is no power under the guise of zoning authority to require the payment of a sum of money to a school district as a condition to the zoning. See Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove (1960), 19 Ill.2d 448, 453-454 ; Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect (1961), 22 Ill.2d 375 .” In the Rosen case the court affirmed a decree which held invalid an agreement that had required the developer to pay $325 per lot sold as a condition for approval of a plat of subdivision containing 52 lots. There we pointed out: “The record in this case shows that the boards of education arrived at the sum of $325 per lot by taking into account factors totally unrelated to the proposed subdivision, such as the time lag between the date when homes are occupied and the date when taxes upon the completed homes are collected. Neither the statute nor the ordinance authorized the plan commission to abdicate its authority in favor of the boards of education. And regardless of advantages of flexibility in equalizing financial burdens that might be secured by substituting monetary charges for the dedication of land, or by combining monetary charges with the dedication of land, the plain fact is that the statute does not authorize this technique. In our opinion the circuit court properly enjoined these practices.” ( 19 Ill.2d at 453-54 .) And in the Rosen case we held that the payments of $325 per lot had been exacted from the subdivider by duress, saying: “The record shows that Firestone is engaged in the business of subdividing raw land upon a large scale, and that it is under contractual obligations to furnish building sites to contractors who are engaged in the construction of buildings. The economic pressure upon such a large scale developer is obvious and we think duress has been established in this case.” 19 Ill.2d at 455-56 . The similarity between the case now before us and the Rosen case is obvious. When the Rosen case was decided in 1960, and when Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill.2d 375 , was decided in 1961, the statute which required plan commission approval of a plat of subdivision authorized the imposition of “reasonable requirements for public streets, alleys, ways for public service facilities, parks, playgrounds, school grounds, and other public grounds.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 24, pars. 53 — 2, 53 — 3; 19 Ill.2d at 451 .) Shortly after Pioneer was decided, the statute was altered to provide: “Whenever the reasonable requirements provided by the ordinance including the official map shall indicate the necessity for providing for a school site, park site, or other public lands within any proposed subdivision for which approval has been requested, and no such provision has been made therefor, the municipal authority may require that lands be designated for such public purpose before approving such plat. Whenever a final plat of subdivision, or part thereof, has been approved by the corporate authorities as complying with the official map and there is designated therein a school site, park site or other public land, the corporate authorities having jurisdiction of such use, be it a school board, park board or other authority, such authority shall acquire the land so designated by purchase or commence proceedings to acquire such land by condemnation within one year from the date of approval of such plat; and if it does not do so within such period of one year, the land so designated may then be used by the owners thereof in any other manner consistent with the ordinance including the official map and the zoning ordinance of the municipality.” Laws of 1961, at 2762; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 24, par. 11-12-8. The General Assembly has never authorized the sale of special use permits, nor has it ever authorized county or municipal governing bodies to exact cash contributions from real estate developers as the price of approval of plats of subdivision. If such legislation should ever be adopted, it would give rise to serious constitutional questions which need not now be addressed. It is enough at this time and on this record to note that the county board exercised in this case an authority that was never conferred upon it by the General Assembly. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9526691. Public record. Not legal advice.