# Orlak v. Loyola University Health System

> Illinois Supreme Court · December 28, 2007 · 228 Ill. 2d 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9525820

## Case

- **Full name:** DIANE ORLAK, Appellant, v. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM Et Al., Appellees
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 28, 2007
- **Citations:** 228 Ill. 2d 1; 319 Ill. Dec. 319; 885 N.E.2d 999; 2007 Ill. LEXIS 1837
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kilbride
- **Judges:** Garman, Kilbride, Burke
- **Cited by:** 93 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9525820

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that for the fraudulent concealment statute to apply, a plaintiff must have relied to her detriment on acts or representations calculated “to lull or induce [the] claimant into delaying [the] filing of his or her claim, or to prevent [the] claimant from 23 No. 1-21-1119…
- holding that “[m]ere silence on the part of the defendant is insufficient” to justify applying section 13-215
- acknowledging that “arising out of patient care” encompasses claims of fraud related to medical treatment

## Opinion text

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring:
The majority relies on this court’s decision in Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502 (2007), in concluding that the plaintiffs claim arises out of patient care. In Brucker, I agreed with the majority’s interpretation of the phrase “arising out of patient care.” Given the facts of Brucker, however, I disagreed with the application of that phrase because the majority placed insufficient emphasis on the fundamental “patient care” component. Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 551 (Kilbride, J., specially concurring).
In this case, I agree that the plaintiffs claim arises out of patient care. The blood transfusion was undoubtedly an integral component of plaintiffs medical care or treatment and, therefore, is within the plain meaning of “patient care.” See Stiffler, 965 F.2d at 141; Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 552-53 (Kilbride, J., specially concurring). Plaintiffs claim alleging harm from the failure to warn of a possible infection originated from the blood transfusion. Accordingly, plaintiffs claim arose out of patient care and falls within the scope of the medical malpractice statute of repose. Thus, I concur in the result reached by the majority despite its reliance on Brucker.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9525820. Public record. Not legal advice.