# McMillan v. Commonwealth

> Court of Appeals of Virginia · December 22, 2009 · 55 Va. App. 392

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9524686

## Case

- **Full name:** Johnathan Wesley McMILLAN v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Virginia
- **Decided:** December 22, 2009
- **Citations:** 55 Va. App. 392; 686 S.E.2d 525; 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 571
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Beales
- **Judges:** Felton, Elder, Frank, Humphreys, Kelsey, McClanahan, Haley, Petty, Beales, Powell, Alston
- **Cited by:** 14 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9524686

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that knife at issue ‘‘does not fit the definition of a dirk, described as any stabbing weapon having two sharp edges and a point’’

## Opinion text

BEALES, J.,
dissenting.
I find that I must respectfully disagree with the majority opinion, as I believe the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find that the knife riveted to appellant’s car door was “a weapon of like kind” under Code § 18.2-308(A). In reaching this conclusion, I tend to agree with Judge Humphreys’s analysis in his dissent to the extent that the knife here is “a weapon of like kind” to a bowie knife. In addition, I agree with the portion of Judge Kelsey’s dissent that distinguishes Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177 , 639 S.E.2d *417 227 (2007), from the circumstances presented by this case, particularly as Farrakhan only indicated an intent to use the kitchen knife as a weapon after he removed it from its place of concealment, id. at 180 , 689 S.E.2d at 229, whereas here, in contrast, McMillan admitted that he intended to use his rather menacing knife as a weapon for his protection when he concealed it in his vehicle. While I agree with the majority opinion that this admission alone is certainly not dispositive of whether the knife is actually a weapon, appellant’s admission is a probative factor to consider when determining if the evidence is sufficient to prove that the knife is a weapon. Therefore, when appellant’s admission is considered together with the other evidence in this case, I would find that the evidence is sufficient to prove the knife is a weapon.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9524686. Public record. Not legal advice.