# Board of Certified Safety Professionals of the Americas, Inc. v. Johnson > Illinois Supreme Court · June 6, 1986 · 112 Ill. 2d 542 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9524559 ## Case - **Full name:** BOARD OF CERTIFIED SAFETY PROFESSIONALS OF THE AMERICAS, INC., Appellant, v. J. THOMAS JOHNSON, Director of Revenue, Et Al., Appellees - **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court - **Decided:** June 6, 1986 - **Citations:** 112 Ill. 2d 542; 98 Ill. Dec. 363; 494 N.E.2d 485; 1986 Ill. LEXIS 277 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Clark - **Judges:** Clark, Simon - **Cited by:** 37 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9524559 ## Opinion text CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: As an institution of justice in a government of laws and not men, this court derives its respect from the soundness of reasoning and correct application of precedent in its decisions. The majority holds that the Board does not qualify for a tax exemption for property used for school or “other educational purposes” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.1). I cannot agree with today’s decision, for it rests upon a foundation that bristles with obvious and profound analytical error. In my judgment the Board stands in a position analogous to the plaintiff in Association of American Medical Colleges v. Lorenz (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 125 , where this court held that the statutory exemption for property used for school or other educational purposes was satisfied. The Board, like the plaintiff in American Medical Colleges, utilizes its property to develop and improve educational standards in its field and curricula at various colleges and universities in Illinois, publishes newsletters, administers examinations, and maintains a library. Notwithstanding the substantial similarity in educational activities performed by the Board and the plaintiff in American Medical Colleges, the majority states that the Board has misplaced its reliance on American Medical Colleges. According to the majority, American Medical Colleges does not support the Board’s position because “[t]he holding in that case was that an organization that is created by tax-exempt institutions that join together to function more efficiently is also entitled to an exemption.” 112 Ill. 2d at 546. Although the holding of American Medical Colleges is quite clear, it certainly is not to be found in today’s majority opinion. The majority’s recital of the rule of law purportedly announced by this court in American Medical Colleges is a misstatement of the true holding and law of that case. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, there is no discussion whatsoever in American Medical Colleges regarding the tax status of the organizations that created the plaintiff. Nowhere in the opinion did this court state that the plaintiff was entitled to tax exemption because its creators were tax-exempt institutions. In fact the opinion never even mentions who ereated the plaintiff. In American Medical Colleges, this court focused not upon the taxing status of the entities creating or sponsoring the plaintiff, but upon the use made of the property in dispute. In rejecting the contention that tax exemption should be limited to property where classes are conducted or courses are taught, this court plainly stated: “The test is use, not ownership or proximity to classroom work.” ( 17 Ill. 2d 125, 128 ). Recognizing that tax-exemption provisions must be strictly construed in favor of taxation (Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387, 390 ), the court concluded that there could be no doubt that the plaintiff’s services in improving educational standards satisfied the property-use test. 17 Ill. 2d 125,129 . In underscoring the fact that plaintiff was not precluded from tax exemption for not offering a course of study, the court observed that the “functions to which plaintiff’s property is devoted are identical to those which would afford exemption if conducted separately by the member institutions.” (Emphasis added.) (Association of American Medical Colleges v. Lorenz (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 125, 129 .) The court did not, however, find that the plaintiff’s member institutions were tax exempt. That question was not even before the court. Too, it is not before this court to decide, as it does in a single conclusory sentence, that “the organizations that sponsor the Board are not themselves tax exempt.” (112 Ill. 2d at 546.) That the inquiry focuses solely on the functions for which the organization uses its property, without regard to its sponsors, is again evident in this court’s statement in American Medical Colleges that “[w]here the functions themselves qualify for exemption it does not matter that.they are performed by a separate organization [e.g., the plaintiff] rather than by the respective member institutions.” ( 17 Ill. 2d 125, 129 .) Further, the majority’s conclusion that the Board “cannot claim an exemption for activities that would not entitle its sponsors to an exemption” (112 Ill. 2d at 546) flies in the face of the fact that virtually the same activities qualified the plaintiff in American Medical Colleges for a tax exemption for property used for educational purposes. Citing Milward v. Paschen (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 302, 308 , the majority also concludes that because the State neither licenses nor registers safety professionals, the Board’s activities do not “ ‘ “substantially lessen[ ] what would otherwise be a governmental function and obligation.” ’ ” (112 Ill. 2d at 546.) However, the majority fails to acknowledge that this court eschewed any application of the aforementioned test in American Medical Colleges, which, in full context, previously required that a private organization provide “a course of study which substantially lessen[ed] what would otherwise be a governmental function and obligation.” (Emphasis added.) (Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387, 392 .) Clearly, this is no longer a prerequisite for exemption since American Medical Colleges holds that an organization which otherwise satisfies the property-use test need not offer a course of study. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9524559. Public record. Not legal advice.