# Commonwealth v. Elliot

> Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · February 4, 1985 · 393 Mass. 824

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9523965

## Case

- **Full name:** Commonwealth vs. Robert G. Elliot
- **Court:** Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
- **Decided:** February 4, 1985
- **Citations:** 393 Mass. 824; 473 N.E.2d 1121; 1985 Mass. LEXIS 1314
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Lynch
- **Judges:** Hennessey, Wilkins, Liacos, Abrams, Lynch
- **Cited by:** 44 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9523965

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing circumstances in which possible error harmless where excluded testimony is cumulative, and citing cases
- reversing on the entire exclusion of witness bias questioning

## Opinion text

Lynch, J.
(concurring). I agree with the court’s decision reversing the defendant’s convictions because of the exclusion of questions on cross-examination intended to show bias of the rape complainant. I depart, however, from the implication that the judge may have abused his discretion in admitting the defendant’s prior rape conviction for impeachment purposes.
In Commonwealth v. Maguire, 392 Mass. 466 (1984), we ruled that it is appropriate to grant appellate review of a judge’s ruling admitting evidence of a criminal defendant’s prior conviction. Id. at 470 . “The question on appeal will normally be whether there was an abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of a prior conviction because the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence of a prior conviction for the purposes of impeachment.” Id. We con- *835 eluded that there was no abuse of discretion in Maguire because “[t]he judge twice gave appropriate limiting instructions, and the prosecution did not misuse that evidence in its argument to the jury.” Id.
The majority has now suggested that it might reverse the convictions if upon retrial the judge admits the defendant’s prior conviction of rape. I would conclude that no abuse of discretion would exist if, as in the first trial, the judge gives appropriate and strong limiting instructions and ensures that the prosecutor does not misuse the evidence.
Evidence of a prior conviction, especially of a violent crime or one involving dishonesty, is probative as to the defendant’s credibility as a witness. See Advisory Committee Note to First Draft of Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609(a), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161 , 297 (1969) (“A demonstrated instance of willingness to engage in conduct in disregard of accepted patterns is translatable into willingness to give false testimony”). A reasonable basis exists, therefore, for the legislative determination that evidence that the defendant has been found guilty of a failure to conform his conduct to the legal norms of society should be brought to the jury’s attention, as an aid in evaluating the defendant’s sincerity and reliability as a witness. The judge’s role should generally be limited to preventing misuse of the evidence, through appropriate limiting instructions and careful monitoring of the prosecutor’s use of the evidence at trial. Only in extreme circumstances, not shown to be present here, would I conclude that the danger of unfair prejudice required the exclusion of such evidence.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9523965. Public record. Not legal advice.