# Hollis v. R. Latoria Construction, Inc.

> Illinois Supreme Court · October 18, 1985 · 108 Ill. 2d 401

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9522446

## Case

- **Full name:** RICHARD HOLLIS, Appellee, v. R. LATORIA CONSTRUCTION, INC., Appellant
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 18, 1985
- **Citations:** 108 Ill. 2d 401; 92 Ill. Dec. 449; 485 N.E.2d 4; 1985 Ill. LEXIS 286
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Ryan
- **Judges:** Ward, Ryan
- **Cited by:** 72 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

JUSTICE RYAN dissenting:
This case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial on all issues, not just on the question of damages only. I therefore dissent.
The majority opinion states that the inadequate award was the result of defense counsel’s improper argument that plaintiff’s conduct contributed to his own injury. Defense counsel’s argument, however, was not that the plaintiff’s conduct contributed to his own injury. Defense counsel stated: “I submit to you that Mr. Hollis himself was the proximate cause of this accident.” (Emphasis added.) The argument therefore was that plaintiff’s conduct was the proximate cause not a proximate cause of the accident or that it constituted contributory negligence. This was an appropriate argument for defense counsel to make.
Also related to the above analysis, I point out that at the end of the opinion the majority states: “The plaintiff’s conduct is not a factor in an action brought under the Act, as the only consideration is whether the defendant’s conduct has been culpable.” (108 Ill. 2d at 411.) I do not agree with this statement of the law. It is far too broad. The culpability of the defendant, that is the wilful violation of the Act, must be a proximate cause (not necessarily the sole proximate cause) of the injury before liability under the Act attaches. The plaintiff’s contributory negligence is not a defense, nor is the plaintiff barred from recovery if his conduct, along with the defendant’s violation of the Act, brought about the injury. However, if the plaintiff’s conduct is the sole proximate cause of the injury (the proximate cause), the defendant is not liable even though there may have been some violation of the Structural Work Act which would not constitute a proximate cause. For instance, if a person jumped off a scaffold which happened not to have some required protective device, the absence of which contributed in no way to the injury, the defendant would not be liable under the Act. As previously suggested, the above-quoted statement of the majority opinion is just too broad.
The Act provides that for the injury to be compensable it must be “occasioned by” a wilful violation of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par 69.) Although, as noted above, contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are not defenses to a violation under the Structural Work Act, the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between any violation of the Act and his own injury. Gundich v. Emerson-Comstock Co. (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 117, 130 ; Schultz v. Ericsson Co. (1914), 264 Ill. 156, 167 ; Smith v. Georgia Pacific Corp. (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 570, 573 ; Beebe v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 43, 48 .
In my opinion the argument of defense counsel criticized in the opinion was proper. The inadequacy of the verdict referred to in the majority opinion reflects a compromise between those who thought the plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injury and those who felt that the defendant’s culpable conduct was a proximate cause of the injury. There was evidence in the record from which inferences in support of both positions could be drawn. Therefore, the matter should not be remanded for a trial on the question of damages only, but should be retried on all issues, liability as well as damages. I therefore dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9522446. Public record. Not legal advice.