# Grayson v. State > Indiana Court of Appeals · June 8, 1992 · 593 N.E.2d 1200 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9521902 ## Case - **Full name:** Sam GRAYSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff - **Court:** Indiana Court of Appeals - **Decided:** June 8, 1992 - **Citations:** 593 N.E.2d 1200; 1992 Ind. App. LEXIS 920; 1992 WL 122084 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Sullivan - **Judges:** Baker, Chezem, Sullivan - **Cited by:** 16 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9521902 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding jury’s request, “ ‘We need to review Mr. Grayson’s testimony from his lawyer[,]’ ” did not manifest disagreement ## Opinion text SULLIVAN, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. With reference to the allegation of prose-cutorial misconduct, I agree that Grayson waived the error inherent in the questions as to whether he was a participant in a scheme to have the confidential informant assassinated. I do not, however, agree that such inquiry could not have had impact upon the jury verdict. The cocaine dealing charge could not have been proved without evidence of the participation of the confidential informant. The implication given to the jury was that if Grayson “held out” and did not plead guilty, “Miss Flo” would have the informant “taken care of”. Such implication might well carry with it an inference that Grayson was guilty of the crime in which the informant was the only other participant, and the crucial witness. Accordingly, I would not categorize the error as harmless; but neither would I say that it was fundamental error so as to require sua sponte reversal. I dissent from that portion of the opinion which would permit the trial court to grant or deny credit for jail time dependent upon whether Grayson has already received credit for that period of time as a result of a probation revocation proceeding in a different court. The majority correctly states that under I.C. 35-50-1-2 the sentence imposed as a result of a probation revocation and the sentence imposed in the instant case must be served consecutively, However, the crediting of jail time against the instant sentence is not affected by whether or not this sentence will be served consecutively to a sentence imposed as a result of probation revocation. To be sure, Grayson may not be entitled to have jail time credit given against each of the consecutive sentences. That does not mean that any particular court, in determining entitlement to jail-time credit, must consider other possible convictions, sentences or charges involved in other courts or other jurisdictions. We have many times stated that consecutive sentencing is a concern for the particular court only when that court is imposing sentences upon multiple convictions. See Kendrick v. State (1988) Ind., 529 N.E.2d 1311 . With reference to jail-time credit, the two cases cited by the majority in footnote 5 are in keeping with Kendrick. In both Lanham v. State (1989) 1st Dist.Ind. App., 540 N.E.2d 612 , trans. denied, and Simms v. State (1981) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 698 , the jail time credit was being assessed with reference to two sentences imposed upon multiple convictions in the same court. In those cases it was therefore appropriate for the court to order credit against the aggregate of the two sentences. It is not appropriate for the Madison Circuit Court to attempt to do so here in consideration of a sentence which may or may not have been imposed as a result of a probation revocation in a different court. The circumstance before us is more closely akin to the consecutive sentence issue as considered in Kendrick v. State, supra, and myriad other cases. See Arnold v. State (1989) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 539 *1208 N.E.2d 969 , trans. denied, and cases there cited. We have held that the details of orchestrating the service of consecutive sentences from different courts is a matter of administrative prerogative for the Department of Correction. Arnold v. State, supra. See also Propes v. State (1992) Ind., 587 N.E.2d 1291 ; Terry v. Byers (1903) 161 Ind. 360 , 68 N.E. 596 . The matter of when a particular period of incarceration should terminate in consideration of jail-time credit while awaiting trial, as well as in consideration of good-time credit during the incarceration pursuant to sentence, should rest within the function of the Department of Correction. 7 Accordingly, I would remand with instructions to give Grayson credit for the number of days spent in jail awaiting trial upon the instant charge and would leave the matter of an actual release date to the proper functioning of the Department of Correction. In all other respects I concur. . It is worthy of note in this regard that the General Assembly included jail-time credit for pre-trial confinement within the very provision which awards good-time credit during penal incarceration and which can only be computed and awarded by the Department of Correction. It would thus appear that legislative design vests the same entity with the responsibility to apply the statute in each instance. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9521902. Public record. Not legal advice.