# Rakowski v. Lucente

> Illinois Supreme Court · November 30, 1984 · 104 Ill. 2d 317

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9519476

## Case

- **Full name:** JOYCE M. RAKOWSKI Et Al. v. JAMES LUCENTE Et Al. (James Lucente, Appellant; Leo R. Rakowski, Appellee)
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** November 30, 1984
- **Citations:** 104 Ill. 2d 317; 84 Ill. Dec. 654; 472 N.E.2d 791; 1984 Ill. LEXIS 384
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Ryan
- **Judges:** Simon, Ryan, Underwood
- **Cited by:** 192 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9519476

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the language “releases and forever discharges [the defendant] . . . from any and all claims . . . known and unknown” was broad enough to preclude the subsequent suit (emphasis added)
- stating that both the meaning of a written agreement and the intent of the parties is to be gathered from the face of the document without assistance from extrinsic evidence
- finding release unambiguous, comprehensive, and applicable to a claim not expressly enumerated where the release used only general language relating to “any and all claims”

## Opinion text

CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting:
In my opinion, the holding in this case as to the effect of a general release cannot be squared with the majority opinion in Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 196 . In fact, the explanation of the majority in this case as to why the general release released all claims tracks closely the rationale of my dissent in Alsup. The arguments put forth in the opinion in this case, in support of the holding that a general release releases all claims, apply equally well to the argument that a general release should also release all tortfeasors.
If Alsup is the law of this State (and, unfortunately, it is), then for the sake of consistency, the general release in this case should be construed as not releasing the right of contribution. Section 2 of the Contribution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 302) does not justify the distinction. I therefore dissent.
JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins in this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9519476. Public record. Not legal advice.