# People v. Williams > Illinois Supreme Court · May 31, 1996 · 173 Ill. 2d 48 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9518988 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. FRANK WILLIAMS, Appellant - **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court - **Decided:** May 31, 1996 - **Citations:** 173 Ill. 2d 48; 218 Ill. Dec. 916; 670 N.E.2d 638; 1996 Ill. LEXIS 70 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Freeman - **Judges:** Bilandic, Harrison, Freeman, Nickels - **Cited by:** 214 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9518988 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the denial of defendant’s request for a continuance of the second stage of the capital sentencing hearing was not an abuse of discretion because the mitigation specialist and the other defense witnesses provided extensive mitigation evidence such that further evid… - holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to bar the State from impeaching the defendant’s credibility with evidence of his prior conviction for aggravated battery where the defendant was on trial for murder and aggravated batt… - holding the trial court did not err in admitting defendant’s previous conviction for aggravated battery to impeach his testimony when the record demonstrated the trial court was “fully aware of the Montgomery standard and the balancing test it requires” - holding that the admission of a witness’ prior conviction as evidence of impeachment is governed exclusively by the three-prong test set forth in Montgomery ## Opinion text JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: Under our sentencing scheme, the second phase of a death penalty hearing requires the jury or the court to weigh and balance any mitigating factors against the aggravating factors. People v. Turner, 156 Ill. 2d 354, 359 (1993). If there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1. In this case, the trial court found no mitigation sufficient to preclude death. A majority of this court now affirms that sentence. I disagree. In People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564 (1980), and People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986), this court, finding that the trial court had not appropriately balanced the mitigation evidence, was prompted to reduce those defendants’ death sentences to life imprisonment. The facts here, though different from those in Carlson and Buggs, give rise to the same kind of concerns. Thus, in my view, the same result which occurred in Carlson and in Buggs should obtain here. In this case, the record reveals that the conduct which ultimately led to Michelle Brueckmann’s death was triggered by defendant’s loss of an exclusive romantic relationship with her. The record consistently demonstrates that the motivation behind this young defendant’s violent conduct, from the time of his breakup with Michelle until her untimely death, was defendant’s emotional inability to cope with the loss of .that relationship. Significantly, the events, which occurred over the course of a four- to five-month period after the breakup, involved those people with whom defendant had previously enjoyed a close and lasting friendship. A review of the evidence is illustrative. Defendant testified that he met Michelle in 1984. He was best friends with her, Anthony Cole, Darrio Ramirez and Noel Garcia. In 1988 defendant and Michelle became engaged to be married. The engagement terminated around September 1990; however, according to defendant, the two continued to see each other. Defendant stated that he did not really consider their relationship as boyfriend and girlfriend to be terminated. In fact, on Christmas of 1990, defendant purchased Christmas gifts for Michelle. Michelle’s mother, Cheryl Brueckmann, testified that Michelle’s engagement to defendant lasted for approximately one year. Prior to becoming engaged, Michelle and defendant had been "going together” for a couple of years. Although the engagement was terminated in the summer of 1990, the couple continued seeing each other. Noel Garcia testified that he had known defendant for about ten years; he used to "hang out” with him. During that time, Garcia saw defendant almost every day. Garcia was also best friends with Anthony Cole and he knew Michelle. According to him, as of January 3, 1991, Michelle and defendant were continuing to date. At sentencing, Garcia testified that in August of 1990, he dated Michelle for a couple of days. On one of their dates, Garcia and Michelle attended the Pan American Fest with Anthony Cole and Dawn Juarez. On the following day, Garcia and defendant went for a drive with Anthony and Darrio Ramirez. After dropping off Anthony, Garcia, Ramirez and defendant continued driving until they reached a dead-end street by the Chicago River. They parked and began to drink a little. While the three were together, and as Darrio stood watching, defendant tied up Garcia and began kicking him in the face and punching him. Defendant then broke a bottle, put it to Garcia’s neck and told Garcia that he was going to kill him because he had been with Michelle. Darrio intervened and Garcia subsequently passed out. As a result of the beating, Garcia sustained a fractured nose and a scarring injury under his left eye. Garcia did not identify defendant to police investigators as his attacker. Instead, he told the police that he had been jumped by some "gang bangers.” Anthony Cole also testified that he and defendant had been friends for about 15 years, seeing each other almost every day. At the time of Michelle’s death, Cole had known Michelle, as a friend, for about five years. Cole testified that he and Michelle dated for about one month before she was killed. Cole further testified that on January 2, 1991, defendant approached him at his home and asked if he had been seeing Michelle. Cole denied seeing her; however, he was dating her and, in fact, Michelle had spent the night at Cole’s house. Cole subsequently called to Michelle to come out of the house and to join him and defendant. Michelle joined them and the three subsequently entered Cole’s car with defendant riding alone in the back seat. Cole then proceeded to drive defendant home. Prior to arriving at defendant’s house, defendant jumped into the front seat with a butcher knife. A struggle ensued and, as a result, Cole received a cut on his hand. Cole stopped the car, he and defendant jumped out, and defendant chased Cole around the car. According to Cole, defendant threatened then that if he saw Cole and Michelle together again, he would kill Cole. Michelle sustained a cut on her hand as a result of this incident. Cole left the area and summoned the police. The police responded and recovered the knife. Cole took Michelle to the hospital for treatment; he, however, received no medical attention for his injury. There were no arrests as a result of this incident. The next day, upon seeing Cole and Michelle together again, defendant shot and wounded Cole and fatally wounded Michelle. There is also testimony that defendant had previously physically assaulted Michelle. On one occasion in particular, defendant beat Michelle, then held a gun to her head and pulled the trigger. He threatened that if he could not have her then no one else would. Fortunately, the gun had no bullet in the chamber which was fired. As is apparent from these accounts, the recurring theme in each episode which led up to Michelle’s death is defendant’s jealous anger over what defendant perceived to be a "love triangle” involving him, his girlfriend and his best friends. The seriousness of these episodes is evident. However, and while I do not mean to diminish that seriousness, the particular people involved as well as the time frame in which these incidents occurred cannot be ignored. Given the dynamics in this case, I find death an inappropriate sentence. Incidentally, Dr. George Savarese, a licensed clinical social worker, testified that Michelle’s murder resulted from an explosion of defendant’s underlying rage, following defendant’s perceived rejection and betrayal by his best friends. My colleagues would rightfully assert that a sentencing judge’s sentencing determination is to be afforded much deference and that altering a defendant’s sentence must be approached cautiously and with the utmost circumspection. These are established and highly valued principles to which I most assuredly adhere. However, they are just that, principles. And, although they guide us in our review, when warranted, they cannot preclude a decision to alter what is an inappropriate sentencing determination. Defendant testified that he always believed that he and Michelle were "going together.” The testimony of Michelle’s mother and of Garcia lend credence to his testimony. This then is clearly a case in which the defendant was unable to appropriately manage the loss of his exclusive relationship with Michelle. Defendant’s problem with managing this loss was merely exacerbated by the fact that the parties who became romantically involved with Michelle were defendant’s closest friends. Notably, this defendant had no juvenile criminal history until the age of 17, at which time he was convicted of aggravated battery. Except for those events, which appear to have been motivated by defendant’s anticipated loss of his exclusive romantic relationship with Michelle, the record does not evidence an ongoing pattern of depraved or violent conduct. The circumstances surrounding these unfortunate incidents were uncontrolled passion and jealous anger. Without question, this defendant should be punished for his terrible deeds. However, unless we carefully sift together all of the facts, all of the circumstances, and all of the dynamics which combine to bring about the commission of a particular offense, we risk, as in this case, a nondiscriminating application of what should be a most discriminately applied punishment — death. As a final matter, I note my agreement with Justice Nickel’s dissent on the issue of the alleged Batson violation. I cannot concur in the majority’s characterization of the State’s proffered explanation as “merely descriptive.” There were only two venirepersons requiring distinction for the court. One was a Caucasian male and the other an African-American male. As between the two, the only necessary and identifying distinction was race. “Merely descriptive,” then, would have been "the black man.” The State’s unnecessary characterization of the African-American venireperson — “You saw he was a black man with red hair” — though not dispositive, certainly suggests the occurrence of a Batson violation. So colorful a characterization not only invites, but warrants, a closer look. I therefore also join Justice Nickel’s dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9518988. Public record. Not legal advice.