# Dovers v. Stephenson Oil Co., Inc.

> Supreme Court of Arkansas · November 13, 2003 · 354 Ark. 695

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9516792

## Case

- **Full name:** Virginia DOVERS v. STEPHENSON OIL COMPANY, Inc., and William Guffey
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas
- **Decided:** November 13, 2003
- **Citations:** 354 Ark. 695; 128 S.W.3d 805; 2003 Ark. LEXIS 603
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Glaze
- **Judges:** Jim Hannah
- **Cited by:** 22 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. In my view, this case should be reversed because there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. On review, we must keep in mind that substantial evidence is evidence that goes beyond suspicion or conjecture and is sufficient to compel a conclusion one way or another.
As I read the majority opinion, this court relies heavily on the case of Schaeffer v. McGehee, 286 Ark. 113 , 689 W.W.2d 537 (1985), where the plaintiff was struck from the rear by the defendant’s vehicle. The Schaeffer court said the fact that the defendant’s vehicle struck plaintiff s car from behind did not create a presumption of negligence on the defendant’s part. That case differs considerably from the present one. In Schaeffer, the plaintiffs injuries were a serious issue because there was evidence from which the jury could infer her symptoms were attributable to other causes, not from the impact of the defendant’s vehicle. Also in issue was the fact that the plaintiff s car was not damaged, nor did the plaintiff allege any property damages. The facts in Schaeffer were factually different — there was ice on the roads, the defendant stopped when he saw the plaintiffs car and then followed at a slow speed, and the defendant was going only five miles per hour when he skidded into the plaintiff when plaintiff stopped.
In the present case, the defendant Guffey denied he had been following too closely, and he did not believe he could have done anything differently to avoid the accident. Guffey also said that the plaintiff Dovers told him at the scene that it was not Guffey’s fault; rather, it was the driver of the black Jeep in front of Dovers. However, unlike in Schaeffer, it is very clear from the evidence that Dovers sustained serious injuries and vehicle damages as a result of Guffey’s running into the rear of Dovers’s car. While Guffey averred at trial that he did not believe he could have done anything differently to avoid his collision with Dovers, he had also admitted that he was within twenty feet of Dovers’s car when Dovers applied her brakes, and when he attempted to stop, “he was too close to stop.” While Guffey’s testimony was in conflict as to whether he was too closely when he plowed into Dovers’s car, the testimony was compelling that he was following too closely when he struck Dovers’s car. As the majority opinion points out, Arkansas State Trooper Goshen investigated the accident and stated that Guffey should have stayed at least 120 feet behind Dovers’s care, and, in his opinion, Guffey was inattentive and following too closely. Dr. Larry Williams, an accident reconstruction expert, rendered his opinion that the accident occurred because Guffey’s tractor-trailer rig was following too closely, or Guffey was not paying attention, or both. Further, Bill Mullenax, founder of the Mid-South Safety Council, opined that it would be “humanly impossible to stop a fully loaded tractor trailer going sixty miles per hour in fifty feet.”
In sum, Guffey’s testimony bearing on his fault went both ways, but the unequivocal testimony of the state trooper, Dr. Williams, and Mullenax placed Guffey at fault. Guffey’s version of what occurred fell into the category of “take your choice” as to which story one might choose to believe. Certainly, Guffey’s conflicting testimony did not compel a conclusion one way or another, which is required when reviewing a case for substantial evidence. Nor, in my view, could one rely solely on Dovers’s remark at the accident that Guffey was not at fault as amounting to substantial evidence, since such a comment in no way placed the fault entirely on the driver of the black Jeep. In sum, this is a comparative fault case with the parties differing over which driver committed what percentage of the blame. This is not a case where no negligence can be assigned to Guffey. Therefore, I dissent.
Thornton, J., joins in this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9516792. Public record. Not legal advice.