# People v. Grimmett

> Michigan Supreme Court · November 29, 1972 · 388 Mich. 590

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9516083

## Case

- **Full name:** People v. Grimmett
- **Court:** Michigan Supreme Court
- **Decided:** November 29, 1972
- **Citations:** 388 Mich. 590; 202 N.W.2d 278; 1972 Mich. LEXIS 138
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Brennan
- **Judges:** Swainson, Brennan, Kavanagh, Adams, Williams, Swain-Son, Black
- **Cited by:** 151 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by People v. White, 390 Mich. 245 (1973).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9516083

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that waiver requires both “specific knowledge of the constitutional right” and an “intentional decision to abandon the ... right” and concluding that no waiver occurred when defense counsel was mistaken in his view of the law
- holding that a 19- month incarceration was not prejudicial because the defendant’s ability to defend himself was not impaired

## Opinion text

T. E. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I agree that the *609 trial court’s dismissal of the Aubrey murder charge was improper, as not having been made upon motion of the defendant. It is perhaps a technicality — but it is a crucial one. Having been in jeopardy in the first Aubrey murder trial, the defendant was entitled to dismissal of the second Aubrey murder charge.
I cannot agree, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the Aubrey killing when it sentenced the defendant upon the Kubon assault. Indeed, our holding today forecloses for all time — because of a procedural flaw— the possibility that Mr. Aubrey’s killer will be brought to justice for the killing of Mr. Aubrey.
It is unthinkable that a trial judge, faced with the solemn duty of pronouncing judgment of sentence upon a defendant should close his eyes to any information about the defendant, his antecedents, his activities, or his proclivities.
If, in considering sentence, a trial judge is properly apprised of the fact that a convicted defendant was habitually truant as a youth, or came from a broken home, or had difficulty keeping a job, or exhibited a surly and uncooperative attitude during his probation interview, or was known or believed to be addicted to drugs or alcohol — if all of this information is to be weighed by the judge — how can he be commanded to ignore the claim that the defendant shot and killed a man during a grocery store robbery?
The process of fact-finding on sentencing is essentially informal and administrative. The sentencing court must make a determination, which is in the best interests of society and the defendant, in the light of all of the facts it is able to gather and digest.
The suggestion that a sentencing court may not *610 delve beyond public records, previous convictions and open-court admissions, is a pernicious departure from our established practice. It would destroy the pre-sentence report as a tool of the administration of criminal justice. It would prevent a defendant from explaining or mitigating a previous conviction, and it would require the people to prosecute to ultimate conviction every known offense against a defendant, even where he stands convicted of one offense, the criminal liability attaching to which is adequate to afford full opportunity for correction and rehabilitation.
I would affirm as to the Kubon assault conviction and sentence.
Black, J., did not sit in this case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9516083. Public record. Not legal advice.