# Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Associates 1990-A, Ltd. > Texas Supreme Court · January 25, 2008 · 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 342 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9512987 ## Case - **Full name:** ARKOMA BASIN EXPLORATION COMPANY, INC., Et Al., Petitioners, v. FMF ASSOCIATES 1990-A, LTD., Et Al., Respondents - **Court:** Texas Supreme Court - **Decided:** January 25, 2008 - **Citations:** 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 342; 249 S.W.3d 380; 166 Oil & Gas Rep. 589; 2008 Tex. LEXIS 70; 2008 WL 204503 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by O'Neill - **Judges:** Brister, O'Neill, Jefferson, Hecht, Wainwright, Green, Medina, Johnson, Willett - **Cited by:** 277 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9512987 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that although 21 the expert’s testimony “could have been a lot clearer” and “references to ‘up here’ and ‘right there’ on slides and posters used at trial” made it hard to tell what the expert was talking about, “we [could not] say on [that] record that his opinions… - explaining that conclusory testimony is that which “simply state[s] a conclusion without any explanation” or asks factfinder to “take my word for it,” and citing Black’s Law Dictionary 308 (8th ed. 2004), as defining “conclusory” as “[e]xpressing a factual inference without st… - stating that no trial court objection is required to argue on appeal that an expert=s testimony is conclusory or speculative on the face of the record but that an objection is necessary before or during trial if the objection requires the court to evaluate the underlying metho… - rejecting argument that expert testimony on oil well reserves was unreliable due to expert’s failure to discount estimates by a capitalization rate when expert’s opinion was based on eight-year ″payouts″ calculation that employed different manner of accounting for risk ## Opinion text Justice O’NEILL, concurring and dissenting. I agree that Arkoma’s reserve estimates cannot all be treated alike, as estimates for the relatively unexplored South Panola field were much more speculative. But the mere fact that estimating the South Panola field’s reserves was more difficult did not provide Arkoma a license to deliberately falsify data to drive up the mineral rights’ acquisition price, of which it received a sizeable percentage, and then cry “opinion” to avoid liability once it pocketed the commission. According to evidence presented at trial, Arkoma did not estimate reserves by working through the necessary data; instead, the desired reserve number was identified, then the calculations were worked backward to determine what the data should be to support that number. While good-faith opinions are shielded from fraud claims under Virginia law, opinions that are deliberately based on information known to be false are not. Yuzefovsky v. St. John’s Wood Apartments, 261 Va. 97 , 540 S.E.2d 134, 142 (2001); Horner v. Ahern, 207 Va. 860 , 153 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1967). I agree with the court of appeals that, even if the repre *392 sented gas reserves were opinions, they are actionable because those opinions were represented to be based on a particular data-driven process that was not used: [Arkoma] told the partnerships they had determined the reserves using a particular process, and the partnerships presented some clear and convincing evidence that [Arkoma] did not use that process but falsified the results through manipulation and falsification of the data and calculations. When estimates and opinions are based on deliberate, intentional falsification of the data and calculations, they are the product of falsified facts and part of the fraudulent misrepresentation. When those estimates are made to a person without the maker’s special knowledge of the subject matter, those estimates, if intentionally misrepresenting the facts, are actionable. 118 S.W.3d 445, 455 (citing Horner, 153 S.E.2d at 220-21 ). According to the evidence presented at trial, Arkoma held itself out as having special expertise in the Arkoma Basin by its possession of a unique database that allowed it to more accurately estimate reserves and potential cash flows. FMF relied on Arkoma’s purported expertise in acquiring the mineral rights that it marketed to investors, and paid a premium for those rights that directly benefited Arkoma. Under these circumstances, I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that Arkoma is exempt from liability for misrepresentations concerning the South Pa-nola field, and to this extent I respectfully dissent. I join the remainder of the Court’s opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9512987. Public record. Not legal advice.