# Busta Ex Rel. Busta v. Columbus Hospital Corp.

> Montana Supreme Court · May 10, 1996 · 276 Mont. 342

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9509941

## Case

- **Full name:** IDA O. BUSTA, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Delbert F. Busta, on Behalf of the Heirs of Delbert F. Busta, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COLUMBUS HOSPITAL CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** Montana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** May 10, 1996
- **Citations:** 276 Mont. 342; 53 State Rptr. 428; 916 P.2d 122; 1996 Mont. LEXIS 89
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Gray
- **Judges:** Trieweiler, Gray, Erdmann, Nelson, Hunt, Leaphart, Turnage
- **Cited by:** 106 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9509941

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (1928), and noting that neither Justice Cardozo’s majority opinion nor Justice Andrews’ dissent “suggested that foreseeability should be considered on a redundant basis as part of both duty and proximate cause”
- holding that an attorney could not express an opinion regarding the medical explanation for a patient’s departure from a hospital window
- discussing that foreseeability of risk is a chief element in determining whether a defendant owes a duty or obligation to a plaintiff and, absent foreseeability, there is no duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff
- discussing “tortuous history” of the “law of foreseeability” of harm under Montana law and, inter alia, clarifying the role of foreseeability of harm in the causation context as a component consideration of proximate cause as applicable in a particular case

## Opinion text

JUSTICE GRAY,
specially concurring.
I concur in the Court’s opinion on issues one and two and specially concur on issues three and four.
With regard to issue three, which relates to the District Court’s failure to instruct on proximate cause, I agree with the result the Court reaches on the issue and with most of its discussion of our case law and other authorities vis-a-vis foreseeability as an element of *376 proximate cause. My one disagreement with the Court in this regard is in its interpretation of § 27-1-317, MCA. I do not read the statute as precluding the consideration of foreseeability as part of causation. Conversely, however, the statute certainly does not require us to consider foreseeability in analyzing causation. Thus, I am persuaded by the remainder of the authorities cited by the Court that we erred in doing so in Kitchen Krafters where no intervening cause issue required its inclusion.
With regard to issue four, whether the hospital was entitled to offset the VA benefits Ida Busta received against the wrongful death damages awarded, I concur in the Court’s opinion. I specially concur only to add that the hospital prepared the Special Verdict which was submitted to the jury and which rendered it impossible for the District Court to calculate whether any offset was authorized (even assuming that the VA benefits met the statutory definition of collateral source). If the hospital wanted to assert entitlement to the offset, it was incumbent upon the hospital to structure a verdict form which would make such a calculation possible.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9509941. Public record. Not legal advice.