# Humphreys v. Clinic for Women, Inc.

> Indiana Supreme Court · September 24, 2003 · 796 N.E.2d 247

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9505380

## Case

- **Full name:** Katherine HUMPHREYS, Secretary, Indiana Family & Social Services Administration, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. CLINIC FOR WOMEN, INC., Women's Pavilion, Inc., Ulrich G. Klopfer, D.O., and Martin Haskell, M.D., Appellees (Plaintiffs Below)
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** September 24, 2003
- **Citations:** 796 N.E.2d 247; 118 A.L.R. 5th 771; 2003 Ind. LEXIS 795; 2003 WL 22204336
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Shepard
- **Judges:** Sullivan, Shepard, Dickson, Boehm, Rucker
- **Cited by:** 18 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9505380

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing, in the context of a challenge under Article I, Section 23, of the Indiana Constitution, that “[b]efore we can determine whether the legislative classification ... is permissible, we need to identify the legislative classification at issue”
- holding that the State has a legitimate “interest in protecting fetal life”
- noting State’s claim under Cheaney of a compelling interest from “conception” but only recognizing, without reference to Cheaney, the State’s “interest in protecting fetal life.”

## Opinion text

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I join in Part I of Justice Sullivan's opinion, but not in Part II, which I think produces the wrong result.
A former colleague of ours onee told us in conference (but never took occasion to say in writing) that for all the jurisprudential effort put into devising standards for trial and appellate review, the most that any articulated standard can achieve is to "tell the judge what mood to be in as he or she approaches a topic." Various standards tell us to be strict or liberal, deferential or non-deferential, to name a few.
The Court correctly announces the standard applicable to the present case. It is that the judiciary should defer to the lines drawn by the General Assembly and Governors Bowen and Bayh unless they are "arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable." Op. at 257, citing Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind.1994).
I cannot say that the decisions made on the very difficult topic of public payments for abortion, made by Indiana's elected representatives (and for that matter by the Congress and President Carter) are so arbitrary and unreasonable that they are unconstitutional.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9505380. Public record. Not legal advice.