# Childress v. State

> Indiana Supreme Court · June 14, 2006 · 848 N.E.2d 1073

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9505201

## Case

- **Full name:** Roger D. CHILDRESS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below); Gary L. Carroll, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. State of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 14, 2006
- **Citations:** 848 N.E.2d 1073; 2006 Ind. LEXIS 474; 2006 WL 1633431
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Dickson
- **Judges:** Boehm, Dickson, Rucker, Shepard, Sullivan
- **Cited by:** 1,408 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9505201

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a defendant who agrees to a sentencing range or a sentencing cap in a plea agreement does not waive the right to challenge the appropriateness of his or her sentence on appeal
- concluding that it is the defendant’s burden to persuade the court that his sentence is inappropriate
- holding the defendant has the burden of persuasion when reviewing for inappropriateness

## Opinion text

DICKSON, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the Court’s decision today, rejecting the claim that a defendant, by entering into a plea agreement providing that the length of sentence is limited to a maximum cap or sentencing range, has waived or automatically acquiesced in the reasonableness of a sentencing that complies with the plea agreement. Such a plea agreement is not an absolute barrier to this Court’s exercise of its authority granted by Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution to “review and revise the sentence imposed,” nor does it necessarily preclude a claim for appellate sentence review under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
I write separately, however, to emphasize my view that our decision today does not hold that a defendant’s acceptance of a plea agreement is wholly without significance or that it must be altogether disregarded. A defendant’s conscious choice to enter a plea agreement that limits the trial court’s discretion to a sentence less than the statutory maximum should usually be understood as strong and persuasive evidence of sentence reasonableness and appropriateness. In my view, today’s opinion permits courts considering future claims for appellate sentence review following such plea agreements to grant relief only in the most rare, exceptional cases.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9505201. Public record. Not legal advice.