# Giles v. Brown County Ex Rel. Board of Commissioners

> Indiana Supreme Court · June 25, 2007 · 868 N.E.2d 478

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9505137

## Case

- **Full name:** Annette Donica GILES, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. BROWN COUNTY, Indiana, by and Through Its Board of Commissioners, Appellees (Defendants Below)
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 25, 2007
- **Citations:** 868 N.E.2d 478; 2007 Ind. LEXIS 486; 2007 WL 1810078
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Dickson
- **Judges:** Boehm, Dickson, Rucker, Shepard, Sullivan
- **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9505137

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding immunity under the ITCA's "operation" or "use" of an enhanced emergency communications system for injuries resulting from failure to provide requested emergency medical services in time to prevent the death of plaintiff's spouse
- noting that the county commissioner’s contract for ambulance services was intended to benefit the county as a whole, not any particular individual; therefore, the contract could not have created any third-party beneficiaries
- applying 9-1-1 immunity statute when county operator dispatched ambulance that did not arrive in time to save heart attack victim

## Opinion text

DICKSON, Justice,
dissenting.
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment based solely on the trial court’s conclusion that Brown County is afforded immunity under Indiana Code § 34-13-3-3(19) from liability for losses from the operation of an enhanced 911 system. As to this issue, the majority summarily adopts the analysis in Judge Sharpnack’s dissent in the Court of Appeals. I disagree.
The immunity as crafted by the statute applies to a loss that “results from” the operation or use of “an enhanced emergency communication system.” Ind.Code § 34-13-3-3(19). As noted in the majority opinion, the parties agree that the enhanced emergency communication system “worked flawlessly.” Op. at 480-81. The plaintiffs claim is not for a loss that resulted from the failure of this communication system, but rather for a loss that separately resulted from the decision not to send an available ambulance due to the ambulance service’s separate obligations favoring the Columbus Fire Department. 1 The statutory immunity, in derogation of common law, must be strictly construed against limitations on the right to bring an action. Hinshaw v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Jay County, 611 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind.1993). I favor the analysis of the Court of Appeals majority, which declined to expand the statutory emergency communication system immunity to include the subsequent dispatching decision that resulted in the alleged loss.
. This assertion is made in the plaintiff's tort claim notice, one of the documents included in the defendant’s summary judgment submissions. Appellant's App'x at 84.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9505137. Public record. Not legal advice.