# Annette (Oliver) Hirsch v. Roger Lee Oliver

> Indiana Supreme Court · June 29, 2012 · 970 N.E.2d 651

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9504836

## Case

- **Full name:** Annette (Oliver) HIRSCH, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. Roger Lee OLIVER, Appellee (Respondent Below)
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 29, 2012
- **Citations:** 970 N.E.2d 651; 2012 Ind. LEXIS 524; 2012 WL 2498895
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Sullivan
- **Judges:** David, Dickson, Massa, Sullivan, Rucker
- **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9504836

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing this provision as a form of emancipation

## Opinion text

SULLIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
Believing that the Court has impermissi-bly rewritten and incorrectly interpreted Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6,1 respectfully dissent.
The Court says that when the circumstances described in Indiana Code section 31 — 16—6—6(a)(3) exist, then a child is emancipated for purposes of Indiana law. This is not correct. E.g., Sexton v. Sedlak, 946 N.E.2d 1177, 1186-87 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 891 N.E.2d 587, 593 (Ind.Ct.App.2008); Marshall v. Marshall, 601 N.E.2d 9 , 12 & n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (interpreting former version of statute); Brancheau v. Weddle, 555 N.E.2d 1315 , 1316-17 & n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (same). Contra Butrum v. Roman, 803 N.E.2d 1139, 1144 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). trans. denied; Connell v. Welty, 725 N.E.2d 502, 505 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6 sets forth three situations in which a child support obligation does not terminate at age 21. *663 Subsection (a)(1) specifies that one of those situations is emancipation, and subsection (b) defines “emancipation.” Ind.Code § 31-16-6-6(a)(l), (b) (2008). If the Legislature intended the circumstances of subsection (a)(3) to constitute emancipation, it would have either included those circumstances within subsection (a)(1) or defined “emancipation” in subsection (b) to include them.
That having been said, I acknowledge that with the Legislature’s recent action reducing the age of emancipation from 21 to 19 effective July 1, 2012, see Pub. L. No. 111-2012, §§ 1-2, 2012 Ind. Acts 1590 , 1590-91 (amending I.C. §§ 31-14-11-18 and 31-16-6-6), the consequences of the Court’s decision are likely to be insignificant.
RUCKER, J., concurs.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9504836. Public record. Not legal advice.