# State v. Rodgers > Oregon Supreme Court · February 11, 2010 · 347 Or. 610 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9503267 ## Case - **Full name:** STATE OF OREGON, Petitioner on Review, v. MICHAEL K. RODGERS, Respondent on Review; STATE OF OREGON, Petitioner on Review, v. ANTHONY DOUGLAS KIRKEBY, Respondent on Review - **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court - **Decided:** February 11, 2010 - **Citations:** 347 Or. 610; 227 P.3d 695; 2010 Ore. LEXIS 61 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Gillette - **Judges:** Muniz, De Muniz, Gillette, Durham, Linder - **Cited by:** 174 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9503267 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding that the defendant, who was asked following a completed traffic stop whether he possessed any weapons and would agree to permit a patdown, “had no way of knowing that [the] questions and request to search the car were not part of the traffic investigation and that h… - concluding, in Kirkeby, that when after an officer’s justification for traffic stop ended, the officer’s subsequent verbal inquires — a request for consent to conduct a patdown and request *210 for consent to search the contents of the defendant’s pockets — represented an unla… - explaining that evidence may be excluded where “a defendant’s [voluntary] consent was derived from, or was the product of, the prior police illegality” and concluding that consent given during unlawful extension of traffic stop was the product of that unlawful seizure (emphase… - explaining that the officers’ questions in both cases extended the stops because their questions occurred after the traffic stops had been completed, were unrelated to the stop, and were not inde- pendently justified - recognizing that drivers are required to stop for police officers and that, as a result, “a traffic stop by its nature is not an ordinary police-citizen ‘encounter,’ as the court described such encounters in Holmes” ## Opinion text GILLETTE, J., concurring. I concur in the analysis and conclusions of the lead opinion, including its reliance on State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005). I do so for a reason sufficiently important (at least to me) that I choose to state it separately. In Hall , a majority of this court announced the rule of law that we apply today. Justice Durham offered a spirited and extensive dissent from that rule, id. at 37-52 (Durham, J., dissenting), which I found persuasive. I therefore joined it. In the present cases, the dissent makes the same analytical and interpretive points that were made in the Hall dissent. *631 Were we writing on a clean slate, I might still find that message persuasive. But we are not writing on a clean slate. The dissent’s points, therefore, are — for me — an echo of an argument fairly waged, but lost. The spirit — the idea — of stare decisis calls for us to accept Hall , get behind it, and make it work. I understand that others feel differently (as they have every right to do) but I hear that call. I therefore join the lead opinion. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US 711, 744-45 , 89 S Ct 2072 , 23 L Ed 2d 656 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining a similar approach). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9503267. Public record. Not legal advice.