# State v. Ashbaugh

> Oregon Supreme Court · December 9, 2010 · 349 Or. 297

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9503236

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE OF OREGON, Petitioner on Review / Cross-Respondent on Review, v. CHARITY ANN ASHBAUGH, Respondent on Review / Cross-Petitioner on Review
- **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 9, 2010
- **Citations:** 349 Or. 297; 244 P.3d 360; 2010 Ore. LEXIS 899
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kistler
- **Judges:** Gillette, Kistler, Linder, Durham, Walters
- **Cited by:** 144 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9503236

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a police-citizen encounter is a constitutionally significant seizure “(a) if a law enforcement officer intentionally and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual’s liberty or freedom of movement; or (b) if a …
- holding that, “[although it is possible to restrict a person’s liberty and freedom of movement by purely verbal means,” the officer did not do so when he asked the defendant whether she had anything illegal in her purse and if he could search it
- explaining that stops generally must be justified by reasonable suspicion that the person has been involved in criminal activity and arrests must be justi- fied by probable cause that the individual has committed a crime
- explaining that police-citizen encounters fall into three categories — mere conversation, stops, and arrests — and that a stop is a seizure that must be supported by a “safety emergency or by reasonable suspicion”
- stating that a seizure occurs “if a law enforcement officer intentionally and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual’s liberty or freedom of movement”

## Opinion text

KISTLER, J.,
concurring.
I join in the majority opinion in this case. I also agree with the principle stated in Justice Durham’s concurring opinion that defendant’s voluntary consent provides an alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s judgment.
Linder J., joins in this concurring opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9503236. Public record. Not legal advice.