# Lawrence M. Tropf v. R. James Nicholson

> United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims · August 24, 2006 · 20 Vet. App. 317

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9502475

## Case

- **Full name:** Lawrence M. TROPF, Appellant, v. R. James NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Appellee
- **Court:** United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
- **Decided:** August 24, 2006
- **Citations:** 20 Vet. App. 317; 2006 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 777; 2006 WL 2434975
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Greene
- **Judges:** Greene, Lance, Schoelen
- **Cited by:** 85 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9502475

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that, when "the meaning of the regulation is clear from its language, then that is 'the end of the matter'" and deference to the agency's position is not warranted (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994))
- noting that a statute is ambiguous when “the application of the ordinary meaning of the words and rules of construction ... fails to answer the question at issue” (citing Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C.Cir.1997) (ambiguity is a conclusion reached when the…
- noting that “a statute is ambiguous only when the application of the ordinary meaning of words and rules of construction to the plain language of the regulation fails to answer the question at issue”
- concluding that if the meaning of regulation is clear, that ends the matter
- stating that the plain meaning of a regulation is controlling

## Opinion text

GREENE, Chief Judge,
concurring:
I concur with the holdings in this case. I write separately, however, because I would hold additionally that Mr. Tropfs constitutional argument is without merit and should be disposed of accordingly. The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Mr. Tropf argues that treating his arm and back disabilities differently in the rating schedule is a violation of due process; he asserts that he should be awarded a compensable rating for his arm because it is essentially the same injury as his back injury. That argument is without merit because treating a veteran’s own injuries differently is not unequal treatment of “persons similarly situated.” Cleburne, supra (emphasis added); Reeves v. West, 11 Vet.App. 255 (1998); Clarke v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 20 (1997).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9502475. Public record. Not legal advice.