# Antwion Thompson v. D. Runnel

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · January 24, 2013 · 705 F.3d 1089

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9501997

## Case

- **Full name:** Antwion E. THOMPSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. D.L. RUNNELS, Warden; Attorney General’s Office, Respondents-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** January 24, 2013
- **Citations:** 705 F.3d 1089; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 1585; 2013 WL 263909
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Goodwin
- **Judges:** Goodwin, Berzon, Ikuta
- **Cited by:** 142 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9501997

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “[b]ecause the legal issue has been fully addressed by both parties, and because it is a simple and straightforward question of law, we do not abuse our discretion in addressing it,” despite the parties not raising the claim to the district court (emphasis added)
- noting that Caspari v Bohlen, 510 US 383, 389; 114 S Ct 948; 127 L Ed 2d 236 (1994
- noting that Caspari v Bohlen, 510 US 383, 389 ; 114 S Ct 948 ; 127 L Ed 2d 236 (1994) held that “ ‘a federal court may, but need not, decline to apply Teague if the State does not argue it,’ but ‘if the State does argue that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of con…
- noting that Caspari v Bohlen, 510 US 383, 389; 114 S Ct 948; 127 L Ed 2d 236 (1994) held that “ ‘a federal court may, but need not, decline to apply Teague if the State does not argue it,’ but ‘if the State does argue that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of const…
- explaining that we “do not abuse our discretion in addressing” a legal issue that was arguably waived or forfeited when the parties had the “opportunity to brief” it

## Opinion text

GOODWIN, Senior Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
A strict adherence to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (AEDPA) compels me to conclude that the California courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court law in following Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) instead of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). The two scholarly opinions written by my colleagues in this persistent appeal demonstrate that the present law on the validity of two-stage custodial interrogation is far from “clearly established.”
In 1966, as a state appellate judge, I learned from the United States Supreme Court that voluntary confessions obtained by police interrogation could no longer be used by state prosecutors unless the confession survived Miranda scrutiny. For the next 46 years, as a state and federal judge, reading trial records and judicial opinions about “voluntary” confessions obtained by custodial interrogations, I learned how law- enforcement behavior evolves and that even the Supreme Court can change its position on interrogation strategy.
The “GVR” that brings this panel back to Mr. Thompson’s two-stage confession requires us to re-examine the confession without reference to Supreme Court law that emerged after Thompson’s state-court review had ended in the California Court of Appeal, and after the state Supreme Court had denied further review, but before the time for a cert petition expired. During that interval, the United States Supreme Court may have modified its own views on delayed warnings in custodial interrogation, or it may not have done so. Who knows?
I concur in Judge Ikuta’s opinion, and commend Judge Berzon for pointing out the procedural confusion caused by the various briefing positions taken by the state.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9501997. Public record. Not legal advice.